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Political participation lies at the heart of democracy. It is also a guaranteed right in international 
human rights law. The fundamental importance of the right of individuals to participate in the 
political life of their state is based on the axiomatic presumption that it gives agency to individuals 
to influence public decisions which can significantly affect their lives.  
Individuals who belong to national minority groups are in a different position regarding the 
exercise of the right to political participation.  Such difference is important for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the marginal position or numerical weakness of national minorities makes it essential to 
consider the role of structural impediments on the way of exercising their right to political 
participation. Secondly, the preservation of cultural identity intensifies the importance of the 
access of national minority groups to forums of public decision-making to be able to protect their 
cultural interests when public decisions affect them.  
The present thesis examines where international human rights law stands regarding political 
participation of national minorities. The research with a legal approach explores different aspects 
of the right to political participation of national minorities with a focus on the Council of Europe 
instruments. In this regard, the right to political participation of national minorities can be studied 
based on three essential criteria developed by the European Court of Human Rights. Those are 
first, indirect discrimination, second, the idea of the effectiveness of the exercise of rights, and 
third, the principle of pluralist democracy. 
Although states do not have a legal obligation to adopt a more favourable approach to political 
participation of national minorities, based on the criteria mentioned above the research reveals 
that the core content of the right to political participation of national minorities is that national 
minorities should be represented and heard when public decisions in some way affect them.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”1 Further, 
it states that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.”2 Some years 
later than the proclamation of UDHR in 1948, the final text of the European Convention on Human 
Rights concluded in Rome embraces the notion of democracy in its preamble, which highlights 
the importance of democracy concerning the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as enshrined in the Convention. The preamble of the Convention states, “[…] fundamental 
freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world […] are best maintained on 
the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and 
observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend.”3 
What comes to mind from the provisions mentioned above of the machinery of human rights is 
that the idea of political participation is a safeguard to ensure that a government has legitimacy 
and subsequently respects and protects the human rights of individuals. The authority exercised by 
the government is derived from the political will of people through their chosen representatives. 
However, the fact that diverse groups live in society might lead to a situation that a group which 
constitutes the majority take hold of the fate of public decision-making. In such a situation under 
the principle of majoritarian decision-making, the chance of influence of national minority groups 
who are marginal due to the difference in lifestyle and numerical inferiority will become reduced. 
In a situation like this, minority groups will lose their capability to follow their interests and affect 
decisions within the legally recognised political institutions.  Furthermore, the lack of participation 
in the course of decision-making can have significant negative impacts on the cultural right of 
minority groups as a guaranteed right within the framework of international human rights law. In 
other words, the lack of public participation by members of national minority groups can foster 
the ground for assimilation and elimination of ethnic, cultural differences. Therefore, the 
protection of lifestyle and other culture-related aspects of national minority communities require 
                                                          
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 21.1 
2 Ibid 
3 ECHR, entered into force 3 September 1953, preamble.  
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a degree of political control over the matters which affects their cultural identity and their special 
lifestyle. 
In this regard, a genuine democracy endorses the protection of minorities through their 
participation in the decision-making institutions of the state. In this respect, the requirement of the 
will of the people,4 as the legitimising force of democratic governance, necessitates the political 
participation of every citizen to reflect his will. Presumably, the will of the people cannot be limited 
exclusively to a group which constitutes the majority. The concept of pluralism as an essential 
component of genuine democratic governance requires that diverse group identities, such as 
cultural identities of national minorities, be included in political institutions of the state. Therefore, 
the reflection of the will of people as the essential objective for democratic governance should 
allow for the reflection of the will of numerically weak groups that constitute national minority 
groups to include their perspectives in the course of national decision-making. 
In light of the importance of public participation of national minorities in the public affairs, the 
main research question of this inquiry is: What is the content of the right to public participation 
for national minorities in the context of international law? Therefore, the thesis will examine the 
content of the relevant international law norms on the human right to political participation of 
individuals belonging to national minorities and its significance for the preservation of minorities’ 
cultural identity. 
1.2. Research Methodology and Research Sources 
The method used in this research project is the legal dogmatic method. The thesis attempts to 
reflect on minorities’ political participation within the limits of legal provisions and overarching 
principles of international law to find relevant standards of international law and evaluate their 
applicability to the main research problem. The research will be primarily based on lex lata for 
examining the content of legal rules pertaining to the research problem. In this regard, the primary 
sources used in this inquiry are primary sources of international law, including international 
conventions, international custom, general principles of international law, and judicial decisions.5  
                                                          
4 ICCPR, entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 25.b; Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force 18 May 1954, 1954, Article 3. 
5 For enumeration of the sources of international law see Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946, Article 
38. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
3 
 
The research will examine the standards developed within the UN system and the regional system 
of the Council of Europe (hereinafter CoE). There are three main reasons behind the idea of 
choosing the European regional system in this thesis. Firstly, the European Court of Human Rights 
provides us with extensive case law related to political participation, democracy, and pluralism, 
which let us conduct a legal analysis on firm ground. Secondly, within the European context, a 
minority-specific approach emerged by the development of Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (hereinafter FCNM) that is an unprecedented achievement 
internationally, because it is a legally-binding convention equipped with a monitoring body 
mandated to issue country-specific opinions and thematic commentaries. Last but not least, the 
colourful ethnic composition of Europe, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern part of the 
continent, makes it a proper context for the study of matters related to minority rights.6  
1.3. The Use of Hard and Soft Law Sources 
Except for the FCNM adopted by the CoE, there is a lack of legally-binding instruments which 
specifically deal with the rights of minorities in a specific manner. There are, however, other 
instruments which deal specifically with minority rights but are soft law sources of international 
law with no legally-binding effect. 
The body of general hard law sources of international law contains scattered legal rules, which can 
serve the protection of individuals who affiliate themselves with minority groups. The hard law 
sources, including conventions, case law, and authoritative interpretations provide us with a 
handful of useful provisions for the protection of minority rights and their right to political 
participation.  
The soft law sources such as the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities concluded by the UN General Assembly and the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life adopted by 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, draw upon the existing international law 
                                                          
6 Schneckener, Ulrich, Senghaas, Dieter, "In Quest of Peaceful Coexistence – Strategies in Regulating Ethnic 
Conflicts". Radical Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Europe, edited by Daftary, Farimah, and Troebst, Stefan, 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2003, p. 166; see also Dunay, Pal, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Eastern Europe: 
Imposed, Induced or (Simply) Reemerged". Human Rights in Eastern Europe, edited by Pogany, Istvan, Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1995, p. 21.  
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standards.7 Thus, although soft law sources produce no legal obligation, they may contain more 
developed interpretations of existing hard law sources. In other words, utilising these sources by 
the present author is limited to the aim of shedding light on the content of general and universally 
applicable provisions of human rights treatises regarding minorities. In this respect, the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 marked the 
beginning of a series of international political efforts. The adoption of a series of documents, such 
as 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting and 1990 Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, although lacking a legally-
binding status, signified the importance of human rights, democracy and protection of minorities 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.8 The aforementioned documents not only 
introduce a new valuable perspective on the issues of minority rights especially after the adoption 
of the Copenhagen Document but are also relevant sources of soft law in the European context, 
because the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) includes all the 47 
member states of the CoE (by April 2019). Also, according to the opinion of the International 
Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. the US, certain commitments contained in OSCE/CSCE 
documents, such as respect for human rights and protection of minorities, especially those which 
are coupled with states treaty obligations, can be regarded as an expression of opinio juris 
regarding member states’ support of a rule.9 
 
1.4. Definitions 
There are two concepts in this inquiry which should be defined due to their central role: public 
participation and democracy. It should be noted that these proposed definitions are not meant to 
distinguish between public participation and democracy; they are only meant to frame the 
definition of these concepts in the context of the present inquiry.   
1.4.1. Public Participation 
                                                          
7 CSCE/OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, September 1999, para. 2. 
8 CSCE/OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
1990, preamble  
9 Nicaragua v. United States of America,  International Court of Justice (ICJ), judgement of 27 June 1986, paras, 188-
189, 264 
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Participation in literal sense means taking part, involvement, contribution, or engagement in a 
project. Public as an adjective means something that is shared, collective, and open to all and is 
non-exclusive. A simple definition that captures the spirit of the term in the context of this inquiry 
is the definition introduced by the International Association for Public Participation which defines 
public participation as, “the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be 
involved in the decision-making process.” 10 
Public participation of minorities encompasses different areas ranging from casting a vote in 
periodic elections or standing as a political candidate in parliamentary elections to the employment 
of persons with minority background in the public sector, such as police forces or the judicial 
system.  Although public participation is not exclusively pertained to participation in the decision-
making bodies of the state in the context of this paper public participation means the participation 
of minorities in national or local decision-making processes through exercising political rights. 
Therefore, the term public participation will be used as an equivalent of political participation. The 
present author will utilise both public participation and political participation interchangeably to 
avoid repetition.  
1.4.2. Democracy 
Perhaps the most well-known definition of democracy is the definition given by Abraham Lincoln, 
who defines democracy as, “Of the people, by the people, for the people.” This definition is, 
however, a limited definition that does not capture the kind of meaning of democracy in the context 
of international human rights law as a guaranteed right with specific characteristics. 
There are different models of democracy in the world. Nonetheless, the fundamental feature of 
democratic governance is that the source of authority is the will of the people and that everyone is 
considered equal for exercising the right to political participation. Democracy, as a form of 
governance, in the context of international law, can be best defined by listing its fundamental 
characteristics. In this respect, the former UN Commission on Human Rights provides a list of 
characteristics of a democratic government as follows: 
Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and of peaceful 
assembly, freedom of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
                                                          
10 “IAP2 Core Values.” International Association for Public Participation, www.iap2.org/page/corevalues, Accessed 
14 September 2018. 
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directly or through freely chosen representatives, and to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic free 
elections by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of 
the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, respect for the rule of law, 
the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, transparency and accountability […].11 
 Three essential elements of democracy can be inferred from this definition. First, respect for all 
human rights, second, respect for the right to participation in the political life of the state and third, 
respect for pluralism.12 Therefore, democracy in this thesis means a kind of government which, 
inter alia, its source of authority is derived from the will of people, respects pluralism in the sense 
of enabling different voices other than that of the majority population to be heard, and protects 
human rights of everyone.13 
1.5. A Theoretical Analysis of Public Participation 
After the thirty year war in Europe and the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th 
century, the concepts of state sovereignty and nation-state came into being in their modern sense. 
The questions related to who the sovereign is and what qualities does the sovereign have in relation 
to its subjects became more prominent in the works of the Enlightenment philosophers in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. In this respect, because states in the modern sense are built in relation to the 
concept of the nation,14 it is essential to examine how sovereignty as the cornerstone of the modern 
state can be translated in the background of democratic governance. In fact, outlining the most 
important ideas pertaining to political participation is beneficial for a robust understanding of the 
right to political participation as a guaranteed right in international human rights law. 
The Enlightenment philosophers, such as Jean-Jaques Rousseau, considered the idea of popular 
sovereignty as a translation of equal participation in political life by individuals. Rousseau believed 
that the only legitimate authority is the authority exercised by people and the sources of enacted 
laws should reflect the collective will of the people. He stated, “[…] sovereignty, being nothing 
but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign power, which is, 
                                                          
11 Commission on Human Risghts, Human Rights Resolution 2005/32: Democracy and the Rule of Law, 19 April 
2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/32, para. 1. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid.  As can be seen, all the mentioned characteristics are interrelated and it is difficult to isolate each one of the 
essential characteristics of democracy without impairing other characteristics.   
14 Mac Laughlin, Jim. Reimagining the Nation-State: The Contested Terrains of Nation-Building, 2001, pp. 10-13. 
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in fact, a collective being, can be represented only by itself […]”.15 Rousseau believed that the 
declaration of the collective will, “[…] is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law […].”16 In the 
Rousseauian idea of popular sovereignty, the source of sovereignty resides in individuals who 
constitute the collective will through which laws are enacted.17 Therefore, the legislator as the 
body for enacting laws borrows its legitimacy from individuals’ collective will and, “the people, 
being subjected to the laws, should be the authors of them […].”18 
Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century philosopher in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
contended that the foundation for moral action is autonomy.19 Kant argued that an action is moral 
only when a rational being acts in accordance with his autonomous will. Therefore, when a rational 
being acts due to external coercion, such an act cannot be regarded as a moral act. Consequently, 
the laws demanding respect cannot be deemed as respecting the autonomous will of a rational 
being if they fail to respect the autonomous will. 
Kant’s argument in his ethical philosophy has essential implications for the idea of political 
participation of members of national minorities. He believes moral action in society is discernible 
only when individuals subject to the law are themselves the legislator of that law.20 He argued:  
[…] every rational being as an end in himself (the idea of human dignity), must be able to regard himself 
with reference to all laws to which he may be subject as being at the same time the legislator of universal 
law, for just this very fitness […] the legislation of universal law distinguishes him as an end in himself, as 
well as every other rational being, as being legislative being.21 
Therefore, the laws which do not result from participation of individuals in the process of 
legislation are heteronomous laws meaning that such laws are in the form of external coercion and 
do not result from the will of autonomous rational beings.22 In other words, if any law is to be 
                                                          
15 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, edited by Dunn, Susan, 2002, 
p. 170. 
16 Ibid, p. 171. 
17 Ibid, pp. 178-180.  
18 Ibid, p. 180. See also Althusius, Johannes. Politica Methodice Digesta. Translated by S. Carney, Frederick, 1995, 
p. 71. Althusius, a 16 and 17th century political philosopher also argues that the sovereignty of state is vested in people 
and the only limit for this sovereignty and enacted laws is divine or natural law (lex divina et naturalis). In the secular 
context of contemporary international law we should understand people sovereignty as against majority despotism 
and natural law in the sense of human rights rules.  
19 Kant, Immanuel. Ethical Philosophy, translated by W. Ellington, James, 1994, pp. 38-39 
20 Ibid, p. 43. 
21 Kant, Immanuel. Ethical Philosophy, translated by W. Ellington, James, 1994, p. 43. 
22 Ibid, pp. 42-43, 45. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
8 
 
considered as respecting the principle of autonomy of the will and thus human dignity of persons 
who are subjected to the law it should meet the requirement that “the will of every rational being 
is […] bound to the rule [law] as a condition.”23 In this regard, Kant seems to believe that the 
subjects of law should have the chance of being included in the formation of the law; otherwise, 
the law is a heteronomous law disregarding the autonomy of the will.  
Kant, in his essay called Principles of Politics, in a similar manner to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
contends that the laws should be enacted only through the participation and consent of the people. 
He argued, “every legislator […] shall enact such laws as might have arisen from the united will 
of a whole people, and it will likewise be binding upon every subject, […] so that he shall regard 
the law as if he had consented to it of his own will.” 24 
Jürgen Habermas, the contemporary German philosopher, argues, “Authority exercised by the 
state cannot dispose over naked repression and it must be anchored in the form of the fair legal 
order.”25 This means that state authority should be exercised through law and the legitimacy of law 
is based on the legitimacy of legislative authorities, i.e., the legitimacy of the law depends on the 
legitimacy of the sources that enact the law.26 In this regard, the allocation of rights and duties 
through a democratic procedure results typically in recognized legal norms.27 Such legal norms 
are not coercive, and everyone despite possible disagreements can agree on the fairness of a legal 
rule enacted through this process.28 Therefore, in a democratic system of governance sovereignty 
as the ultimate authority in a state is vested in law,29which borrows its legitimacy from people who 
directly or indirectly through their representatives participate in the process of law-making.  
The ability of citizens to participate in decision-making constitutes the core of the legitimacy of a 
legal rule in a democratic state in which, “only those norms can be valid that meet with the approval 
                                                          
23 Kant, Immanuel. Ethical Philosophy, translated by W. Ellington, James, 1994, p. 44.  
24 Hayden, Patrick. The Philosophy of Human Rights. 2001, p. 116. For this quotation I have relied on a condensed, 
reprinted part of the Kant’s Principles of Politics in the aforementioned source.  
25 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. 1989, p. 188.  
26 See Lagerspetz, Erik, "Collective Intentions, Legislative Intents, and Social Choice". Pluralism and Law, edited by 
Soeteman, Arend, 2001, p. 375.  
27 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. 1989, p.188. 
28 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. 1989, p.188. 
29 See Wade, H. W. R. “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty.”  The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 13, issue. 2, November 
1955, p. 189. 
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of all affected in their capacity as participants.”30 In this regard, although the participatory aspect 
of the legitimacy of a rule is a necessary condition for democratic governance, it is not a sufficient 
one in the sense that the consequences of an enacted law should be within certain limits that they 
are not grossly against the essence of human rights and interests of certain individuals, such as 
persons belonging to national minorities. In other words, enacted laws should be in everyone’s 
interests,31and if laws aim to be in everyone’s interests, they should be enacted through a procedure 
which allows for those affected to influence the result of the outcome of the decisions in the 
legislature, that presumably include national minorities as well.  
Habermas, following the same line of thought as Rousseau and Kant, contemplates democratic 
governance as a form of governance where subjects of the law (individuals) can affect the law-
making process.32 However, such participation should not merely be restrained to those individuals 
who constitute the majority of the population. As Sanford Levinson argues, almost all nations in 
the world host in some way national minority groups and it is difficult to argue any state is 
homogeneous.33 Thus, in this background, persons who identify themselves as belonging to a 
national minority community might have different values and interests. Such a difference in 
cultural identity intensifies the need to participate in political life as national minorities to protect 
their cultural identity and interests. 
Hanna Arendt also examines the importance of political participation for cultural identity in her 
theory of public space.34 Arendt interprets political participation as a way to enable those 
individuals whose identities are different from those of the majority to be seen and heard.35 Arendt 
illustrates the importance of public participation by an interesting analogy. She states: 
The poor […] feels himself out of the sight of others, groping in the dark. Mankind takes no notice of him. 
He rambles and wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in the market […]. He is in as much 
                                                          
30 Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 1990, p. 66. 
31 Ibid, p. 65. 
32 Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 1990, p. 66. See Sitaropoulos and 
Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 15 March 2012, application no. 
42202/07, para 61. 
33 Levinson, Sanford. "Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?" YouTube, uploaded by Harvard Law School, 19 October 
2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiFq2HC2q0E. Speech by Levinson given in a panel hosted by Harvard Law 
School Library, accessed 05 April 2019 
34 d'Entrèves, Maurizio Passerin. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, 1993, pp. 139-143. 
35 Ibid, pp. 46-47. 
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obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar. He is not disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only 
not seen.36 
Enabling national minorities to have a political voice should be the function of a genuine plural 
democracy which recognises the right of everyone to have a share of influence in the final result 
of public decisions.37 As Hannah Arendt explains, “people who are deprived of human rights are 
deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action […]”38 Therefore, the inclusion of 
voices of national minority groups is a fundamental characteristic of a plural democracy. In this 
regard, political participation as the heart of democratic governance becomes instrumental for 
preserving minorities identities by which the flow of influence of individuals who identify 
themselves as belonging to national minorities moves toward the state authority in a way that 
enables them to protect their identity.39  
To conclude, one can argue that in a democratic context, states borrow their legitimacy from the 
inclusion of people. If this inclusion falls short of including political voices of national minority 
groups, the legitimacy of the state concerning the members of those minority groups will become 
impaired. It can be inferred from the thoughts of philosophers, such as Kant, Rousseau, Habermas, 
and Arendt is that the political voices of national minorities should be protected to enable 
individuals who belong to national minorities to regard themselves, like the majority of the 
population, both as subjects and creators of the laws.40 
 
                                                          
36 Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution, 1963, p. 69. 
37 See Arendt, Hanna. The Human Condition, 1958, p. 50. See also Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
1994, pp. 296-297. Arendt thinks that the exclusion of Jews in Nazi Germany was not based on depriving them of 
their natural rights, but quite differently, it was based on the distortion of their appearance in public life and their 
ability for social communication which made the natural rights claims of Jews unfruitful. Similarly, it can be argued 
that it would not be possible for a national group to enjoy its human rights and freedoms and preserve its identity 
against assimilation without having a voice in the processes of public decision-making. 
38 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 1994, p. 296.  
39 See Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. 1973, pp. 60-65. The fundamentality of public participation is also reflected 
in Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls develops his theory of justice by drawing upon two principles that any just society 
needs to recognise, firstly, all rights and liberties are guaranteed to everyone to the most extensive possible. Secondly, 
inequalities shall satisfy two conditions: first, the inequalities are attached to positions open to all under the condition 
of equality of opportunity and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the most disadvantaged members of the 
society. The first principle of Rawls’ theory of justice indicates that in an original position individuals come together 
to agree on a set of goals with the condition that their competence to participate in public affairs to secure their rights 
and interests is recognised. It is through the recognition of public participation that individuals acquire the ability to 
protect their interests. 
40 Kant, Immanuel. Ethical Philosophy, translated by W. Ellington, James, 1994, p. 43. 
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2. Minority: Definition and Recognition 
2.1. Objective and Subjective Criteria  
The term ‘minority’ has no definition in international law. Even minority-specific instruments, 
such as FCNM adopted by the CoE, lack a definition of the term minority, and it is left to states to 
decide who the right-holders of the catalogue of minority rights are. As a result of the wide 
discretion afforded to states, several member states of FCNM, such as Estonia, Austria, Poland, 
Luxemburg, and Germany have declared unilaterally their understanding of to whom the term 
national minority applies. 41 The wide discretion of states in the determination of who belongs to 
a national minority group is indicative of the disagreement among states in this matter. 
Nonetheless, one of the widely cited definitions of the term ‘minority’ among legal scholars is the 
definition proposed by Francesco Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the term minority. Capotorti defines 
minorities as: 
[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose 
members-being nationals of the State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their 
culture, traditions, religion or language.42 
 It should be born in mind that Capotorti definition is a proposed definition and lacks any legal 
status. The lack of consensus on the definition of minority, however, runs the danger of 
undermining the protection of minorities. In the context of the present thesis, although not all 
minority groups can be competent for the exercise of public participation based on their minority 
status, it seems that states are not entirely free in refraining from affording minority status to 
minority groups if such minorities exist on their territory.  
There are several indicators to grip the essence of a definition of minority for the purpose of the 
right to political participation. Although there is no international consensus on the definition of 
minority, the existence of minority groups can be determined by using two criteria of subjective 
and objective criteria. On the one hand, objective criterion refers to the question of the actual 
                                                          
41 Thiele, Carmen, "Minorities and Minority Rights in Europe". Human Rights in Europe: A Fragmented Regime, 
edited by Brosig, Malte, 2006, p. 126. 
42 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, UN 
Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, 1979, para. 568. 
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existence of minorities as a distinct, identifiable group with solid cultural or historical roots. On 
the other hand, subjective criterion refers to self-identification of individuals who identify 
themselves as belonging to a group which has different cultural characteristics to that of the 
majority population and wants to be recognised according to such cultural identity by others.   
The objective criterion for the recognition of a minority community is a question of fact. According 
to Max Van Der Stoel, the former CSCE/OSCE Higher Commissioner on National Minorities, 
“even though I may not have a definition of what constitutes a minority, I would dare to say that I 
know a minority when I see one.” 43 In this regard, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) in its Greco-Bulgarian Communities advisory opinion held:  
[…] the community is not a creation of the local law but has an existence in fact, its dissolution is also a 
question of fact; this dissolution has not to be pronounced ' by any competent body, as might possibly be the 
case if the community itself had been constituted and recognized in accordance with some local law.44 
Similarly, in the Secretary-General Memorandum on the definition and classification of minorities, 
the term minority is interpreted in the strict sense of the existence of a national community that 
“differs from the predominant group in the state.”45 In this respect, the first part of the Capotorti 
definition which refers to a, “group numerically inferior,” refers to the objective criterion.46Thus, 
there should be a community, and that community should be different from the majority of the 
population in terms of ethno-racial characteristics. The distinctiveness of characteristics of a 
community and the desire to preserve those characteristics is also reflected in the PCIJ opinion. 
The Court stated:  
[…] a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and tradition 
of their own and united by this identity of race, religion, language and tradition in a sentiment of solidarity, 
with a view to preserving their traditions, […] and rendering mutual assistance to each other. 47 
                                                          
43 Von Der Stoel, Max, “Address given in CSCE Human Dimensions Seminar Case Studies on National Minority 
Issues: Positive Results”, 24 May 1993, Warsaw. 
44 Permanent Court of International Justice, Greco-Bulgarian Communities (Advisory Opinion No. 17), Series B, No. 
17, 31 July 1930, p. 28. 
45 Definition and Classification of Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/85, 27 December 1949, para37.  
46  Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, 1979, para. 568. 
47 Permanent Court of International Justice, Greco-Bulgarian Communities Advisory Opinion, Series B, No. 17, 31 
July 1930, p. 33. 
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Further, the Court states, “The existence of communities is a question of fact; it is not a question 
of law.”48 In lights of the PCIJ explanation, both subjective and objective criteria shall be satisfied 
to determine the existence of a minority community. The existence of a, “sentiment of solidarity,” 
can be deemed as the subjective criterion, which refers to a sense of self-awareness among 
individuals who identify themselves as belonging to a minority community.   
The subjective criterion, as stated in the ACFC Thematic Commentary No. 4 on the scope of 
application of the FCNM, refers to self-identification as a decisive point when an individual 
decides whether to avail him/herself to the protection of the convention or not. 49 The requirement 
of self-identification “based on good faith and not for gaining an advantage”50 can be conceived 
as the subjective criterion by which individuals wish to be recognised as belonging to a national 
minority.  
The UN Human Rights Committee in its GC No. 23 states, “the existence of an ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minority in a given state party does not depend upon a decision by that State party but 
requires to be established by objective criteria.”51 In this regard, the response of some states to 
Capotorti definition of the term minority might be relevant regarding the question to whom the 
term minority can be attributed. For instance, the Netherlands and Greece emphasised the 
established and distinctive characteristic of national minorities, because otherwise, “every country 
would be composed of minorities within the meaning of Article 27.”52 Therefore, the objective 
criterion should accompany the subjective criterion for determination of the existence of a minority 
group.53 This can be for example the existence of a national minority community concentrated in 
a territory, which has a traditional lifestyle or a dispersed community that its members utilise a 
common language or a religion that differs from that of the majority population. 
                                                          
48 Permanent Court of International Justice, Greco-Bulgarian Communities Advisory Opinion, Series B, No. 17, 31 
July 1930, p. 28. 
49 ACFC, Thematic commentary No. 4: The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, adopted 27 May 2016, ACFC/56DOC (2016)001, para. 9. 
50 Ibid, para. 10. 
51 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, 8 April 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 
5.2. 
52 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 1979, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1,  para. 31. 
53 ACFC, Thematic commentary No. 4: The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, 27 May 2016, ACFC/56DOC (2016)001, para. 11. 
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In the CoE setting, in Gorzelik and others v. Poland, applicants wanted to register an association 
which aimed to protect the minority identity of the Silesian national minority in Poland. The 
insufficiency of the subjective criterion to determine the existence of a national minority group is 
apparent in this case.54 The domestic authorities in Poland doubt such registration by a minority 
group which its minority status was disputed. In fact, there were grounds to believe that the 
concerned group seeks to circumvent legal norms to gain eligibility for special protections afforded 
to national minority groups under the domestic law, such as exemption from electoral thresholds, 
and thus secure easy access to the national parliament for themselves.55 The Court agrees that the 
term minority is difficult to define and Poland authorities’ decision on exclusion of the applicant 
from falling under the category of minority community was for the protection of legal order and 
rights of others, which does not constitute a violation under ECHR.   
In light of the Greek government reply to Capotorti Report, “a minority actually feels itself to be 
a separate section of the community or is felt to be and is perhaps treated as such by others should 
also be taken into consideration for any interpretation of the term minority.”56 Therefore, the 
objective criterion refers to the actual existence of a collective identity, and the subjective criterion 
is concerned with the individuals who want to be recognised as belonging to a national minority 
group. In this regard, neither objective criterion nor subjective criterion can be treated 
independently to determine the status of a group of individuals as a national minority group.  
 
2.2. Nationality Requirement 
The Advisory Committee of FCNM, which monitors the implementation of the Convention, has 
firmly expressed the view that provisions of FCNM also apply to non-citizens.57 Nonetheless, 
participation in the political life of a state is based on the status of citizenship, which entitles only 
citizens of a state to exercise their right to political participation in an equal manner. In this regard, 
the nationality requirement does not stand at odds with the protection of the right to political 
                                                          
54 Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 17 February 2004, Application No. 
44158/98, para. 76. 
55 Ibid, paras. 32, 36, 76. 
56 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 1979, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para. 36.  
57Weissbrodt, David. Final Report of the Rights of Non-citizens-Regional Activities. 26 May 2003, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23/Add. 2, para. 41-43. 
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participation as a human right. Also, Article 25 of ICCPR explicitly mentions the concept of citizen 
as the right-holders in contrast to other provisions of the Covenant, which apply to every human 
being.58 Some scholars have argued that a distinction between aliens and citizens is permitted only 
where explicitly provided in human rights treaties.59 Such interpretation confirms explicitly with 
the text of Article 25 of ICCPR as well as P1.3 of ECHR. Therefore, certain rights, such as the 
right to political participation of persons belonging to minorities, can be guaranteed only in relation 
to nationals of a country, and thus aliens can become excluded to exercise public participation as 
a right on the territory of another state where they are not nationals.  
Regarding the right to political participation, it requires that persons belonging to a minority group 
should be nationals of the state they want to participate in its political affairs. In this regard, 
nationality as a relationship between state and individuals is a legal relationship. ICJ in Nottebohm 
case defines nationality as, “A legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights 
and duties”60 further the Court concludes, “[…] Nationality in this sense is concerned with the 
determination of rights and duties of nationals.”61  
Also, the right to public participation of individuals belonging to national minorities cannot be 
invoked to include transient moods. Indeed, this right seems to exclude new minority groups 
formed by migration or awakening of historical identities, which existed in the past.62 The term 
national minorities for the purpose of exercising the right to public participation should be 
understood as a distinctive, long-established community in the territory of a state in a non-
dominant position whose members wish to preserve their cultural identity63and are nationals of the 
hosting state. This view is also confirmed in the following opinion of the UN Human Rights 
Committee: 
“The obligations deriving from article 2.1 are also relevant [for the protection of all minorities who are on 
the territory of a state], since a State party is required under that article to ensure that the rights protected 
under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, except 
                                                          
58 ICCPR, entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 25. 
59 Ramcharan, G. Bertrand. "Equality and Non-Discrimination.". The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, edited by Henkin, Louis 1981. p. 263. 
60 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 April 1955, P. 23. 
61 Ibid 
62 Thornberry, Patrick, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 1991, p. 168. 
63 Ibid, p. 170.  
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rights which are expressly made to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under article 25 [emphasis 
added].  A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under article 27 to its citizens alone”.64 
One can safely argue that the protection of minorities in the sense of the right to political 
participation is an apparatus in international law which does not encompass the protection of 
persons who belong to non-national minority groups. In this regard, Patrick Thornberry argues, 
“Many states are unwilling to accept voluntary immigrants taking the state’s nationality as being 
minorities; a fortiori, they are even less well disposed to accept the notion that foreigners are the 
recipients of minority rights.”65 The Travaux Préparatoires of ICCPR also indicates that during 
the drafting process of the text of Article 27 of ICCPR states distinguished between aliens or non-
national minorities whose members might even be the citizens of the host country. In this regard, 
the right to political participation of individuals belonging to national minorities encompasses only 
national minority communities that are long-established on the territory of a state and have a 
distinct cultural character different to that of the majority population.66 
Therefore, when national minorities meet the requirements of membership in the bigger unit of the 
state through citizenship status, their right to political participation as individuals belonging to a 
national minority community can be guaranteed under international human rights law to enable 
them to influence the outcome of the political decision-making to protect their interests.67  
 
 
                                                          
64 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, 8 April 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 5.1. 
65 Thornberry, Patrick, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 1991, p. 171. 
66 General Assembly, 16th Session Official Records, 14 November 1961, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1104, paras. 7, 17.  
67 Timishev v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Jedgement of 13 March 2006, Applications Nos. 55762/00 
and 55974/00, para 58; ; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 13 
November 2007, Application No. 57325/00, para. 176; Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, European 
Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 13 August 1981, Application No. 7601/76; 7806/77,  para. 63; Izzettin Dogan 
and others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 26 April 2016, Application No. 62649/10, 
paras. 103, 108-109. 
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3. Democratic Governance and Minorities’ Political Participation 
3.1. The Role of National Minorities in Political Life  
Power accompanies the ability to control people and events affecting them.68 As was examined in 
chapter 1, power or authority in a democratic setting resides in people.  It is in this context that the 
participation of national minorities becomes essential because if access to the means of collective 
decision-making becomes impeded for national minorities, they will lose their ability to decide 
upon the matters which are essential to their cultural identity. 
Democracy at its heart has the core idea that the legitimacy of the authority is derived from the 
consent and participation of individuals who are citizens of a state (the idea of democratic 
franchise). In other words, legislative mechanisms and enacted laws, which affect the lives of 
individuals, cannot be considered legitimate if individuals have not consented those enacted laws 
through either direct consent or the consent of their representatives. Therefore, the idea of 
participation of all the segments of society in the decision-making process and the mechanisms 
that allow for the effective participation of diverse groups constitute the core of democratic 
governance.  
In this regard, democratic governance and minorities’ participation in political and public decision-
making acquires its importance for several reasons. Firstly, political participation as a right is 
enshrined in the ratified international and regional human rights treatise as a guaranteed right. Its 
meaningful application regarding minorities needs special considerations, and it should be 
understood beyond the mere formal recognition of this right by giving due attention to the specific 
needs of national minorities.  
Secondly, historical marginalisation of national minorities has led to structural exclusion and thus 
the violation of human rights of individuals belonging to national minority groups in various ways. 
Participation of national minorities in political life and public institutions can be a response to 
more extensive problems, such as discrimination and marginalisation of minority groups. It is 
because political participation can empower individuals belonging to minorities to deal with their 
concerns by means of the authority granted to them to have a share in the working of political 
institutions.  
                                                          
68 Weller, Marc. "Democratic Governance and Minority Political Participation: Emerging Legal Standards and 
Practice." Political Participation of Minorities, edited by Weller, Marc, Nobbs, Katherine, 2010, p. 1Vii. 
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Finally, from the perspective of national peace and security, an inclusive, plural democracy, which 
allows national minority groups to take part in public decision makings on an equal footing with 
the majority population, can be the ultimate solution for the prevention of ethnic conflicts, and 
threats to both national, and international security. The security dimension of national minorities’ 
political participation will not be covered in the present thesis. Nonetheless, the security dimension 
of national minorities’ issues constitutes a considerable part of the works of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has had a central role in the security paradigm of 
Europe after the cold war. The participating states in the Conference on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE emphasised the importance of respect for the universal human rights of national 
minorities for the reasons of peace and prevention of conflict. In this regard, the Copenhagen 
Document reaffirms, “minority rights are part of universally recognised human rights is an 
essential factor for peace, justice, stability, and democracy in the participating States.” 69 
3.2. Public Participation: A Substantive, Enabling Right 
The substance of national minorities’ rights might involve two kinds of typical solutions. The first 
category of minority rights are concerned with issues, such as language, culture, education, and 
access to jobs; these rights can be categorised as object-oriented. The second category is the issue 
of participation of minorities in the public affairs of their country. This right has a process-oriented 
nature, which can result in one or more objects of the first category. It should be noted that in order 
to make such a process of public participation meaningful, it should aim for a result-oriented 
approach by which the protection of minorities’ cultural identity is ensured. This approach 
considers the right to public participation of national minorities as an enabling right that its 
objective is the protection of matters of primary importance to national minority groups, such as 
their cultural identity.70 In other words, full equality and protection of minorities’ identity are the 
outcomes of effective political participation. In this regard, ACFC Commentary on Article 15 of 
FCNM regards full equality, protection of minorities’ cultural identity and participation of 
minorities in public life as, “three corners of a triangle,” which constitute the foundation of 
                                                          
69 CSCE/OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 
June 1990, para 30.  
70  ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, 5 May 2008, para. 15.  
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FCNM.71 The Advisory Committee of FCNM is of the opinion that whatever the mechanisms of 
public participation are, they should satisfy two requirements and those are, “[…] real 
opportunities to influence decision-making and the outcome of which should adequately reflect 
their needs”.72 Indeed, political participation of minorities, in addition to providing equal 
opportunity to become represented in the forums of public decision-making, should result in the 
protection of national minorities’ cultural identity. Therefore, the right to public participation is a 
human right in itself, which plays a crucial role in the effective exercise of other human rights, 
especially the protection of national minorities’ right to culture.73  
 
 3.3. An Analysis of International Standards on Minorities’ Public Participation 
It is important to distinguish between universally applicable human rights and specific minority-
related rights, which persons belonging to minorities can enjoy in accordance with their association 
to a minority group. The former include the universal rights and freedoms that states must respect, 
protect, and promote concerning all individuals within their jurisdiction in a non-discriminatory 
manner as stipulated in Article 2 of ICCPR, Article 1 of CERD, Article 14 of ECHR and Article 
1 of Protocol No. 12 to ECHR. The grounds of discriminations include any differentiation based 
on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
association with a national minority or another status. The latter refers to a specific apparatus of 
international law which applies to persons who identify themselves as belonging to a minority 
group to protect their cultural identity. As Patrick Thornberry argues, the human rights element of 
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the treaties are secured to all inhabitants of a state, whereas 
those rights with minority rights element are related to persons belonging to national minority 
communities.74  
Although there is a difference between minority rights of individuals who belong to national 
minority groups and the general category of human rights, it does not exclude the relation between 
the generally codified human rights and those provisions with a more minority-centric language 
                                                          
71 ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, 5 May 2008, para. 13.  
72 Ibid, para 71.  
73 UN General Assembly, Factors that impede equal political participation and steps to overcome those challenges, 
A/HRC/27/29, para. 88. 
74 Thornberry, Patrick, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 1991, p. 170. 
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enshrined in FCNM. We need to draw on both of these categories mainly because the corpus of 
universally applicable human rights are legally-binding and contain treaty obligations which can 
be of use for legal interpretation to compensate for the weakness and the lack of clarity regarding 
standards related to the protection of national minorities.  
 The weakness of international instruments regarding minority rights is in two respects. Firstly, 
except for the legally-binding FCNM, they either lack a legally-binding status or lack a juridical 
character to allow individuals to enforce the implementation of related provisions by legal actions 
before a competent court or tribunal. Even FCNM, as the only legally-binding instrument 
dedicated to the protection of national minorities, does not foresee any mechanism for individual 
complaints regarding the violation of the provisions of FCNM. Secondly, the content of minority-
related instruments, such as FCNM, “includes no directly applicable rule but disposition 
programs,” which leaves states with a wide margin of discretion.75   
Therefore, we need to rely on the generally applicable body of human rights and relevant 
international law principles to give a concrete interpretation to the question of minorities’ 
entitlement to participate in the political and public life of their states and consequently identify 
related shortcomings. In this regard, the International UN system and the regional system of the 
CoE will be discussed and analysed in terms of the developed standards pertaining to the protection 
of minority communities and the public participation of persons belonging to national minority 
communities. Besides, the CSCE/OSCE as a multilateral political organisation will also be 
discussed because, despite its non-binding character, it can shed light on relevant hard law sources 
regarding public participation of persons belonging to national minorities.  
3.3.1. The UN System 
Within the UN human rights protection system, the only document which is specifically concerned 
with the protection of minority rights is the non-binding 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by General 
Assembly, which contains provisions that specifically deal with minorities.76  In this regard, the 
                                                          
75 Thiele, Carmen, "Minorities and Minority Rights in Europe". Human Rights in Europe: A Fragmented Regime, 
edited by Brosig, Malte, 2006, p. 125.  
76 See UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, 18 December 1992. UN Doc. A/RES/47/135. 
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UN instruments can be divided in terms of their relevance to the protection of minority rights into 
two groups.  
The first category is the UN Minority Declaration and related Special platforms and mandate 
holders that exclusively deal with minority rights issues. These are mainly preoccupied with, inter 
alia, the thematic reports, promotion of dialogue among states in matters related to minority groups 
and the provision of advice on the minority-specific issues, which lack a legally-binding status. In 
this respect, the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, the Special rapporteur on minority issues 
and the UN Forum on Minority Issues share the common goal of promotion of the implementation 
of the UN Minorities Declaration.  
The second category is the UN General human rights instruments, including International 
Covenant on Civil, and Political Rights and the instruments primarily adopted for dealing with 
other human rights concerns, such as the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
discrimination (ICERD). These instruments are legally-binding and contain provisions on the 
protection of national minorities, such as Article 5.C of ICERD, which refers to the public 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities as one of the effective ways for the 
elimination of racial discrimination.77 
In addition to Article 5.C of ICERD, which refers to public participation as an instrument for 
encountering discrimination, Article 25 of ICCPR provides for the right to public participation in 
a general language as the right of every citizen. The right to political participation is also reflected 
in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The chapeau of Article 25 of ICCPR 
provides for the right to political participation with an explicit reference to Article 2 of the same 
covenant on the prohibition of discrimination. This explicit reference to Article 2 of ICCPR can 
reflect the importance of the principle of non-discrimination for the exercise of the right to political 
participation. Article 25 of ICCPR states:  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 
and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
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(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.78 
Similarly, Article 21.1 of UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of 
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”79 Subsequently, Article 21.3 of 
UDHR holds, “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”80 The difference of the 
formulation of Article 21 of UDHR, taking into account its customary status in international law, 
is that it explicitly refers to public participation of people as the legitimising source of political 
authority.  
Article 25 of ICCPR in conjunction with Article 27 of the same covenant, regarding the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their culture, profess and practice their religion and 
language, as well as Article 2.1 and 2.2 on the principle of non-discrimination,81 constitute the 
basic rules for the protection of the content of the effective participation of minorities in political 
life.  
In this regard, Article 25 of ICCPR and its interrelatedness with Articles 2 and 27 can guide us to 
a particular understanding of the content of the universal right to political participation, and its 
application concerning individuals belonging to national minorities. Martin Scheinin in his 
individual dissenting opinion, in the communication brought against Namibia before the Human 
Rights Committee, argues that the Committee failed to interpret article 25 in the context of 
minorities’ enjoyment of the right to participation in public affairs. He states: 
There are situations where article 25 calls for special arrangements for rights of participation to be enjoyed 
by members of minorities and, in particular, indigenous peoples. When such a situation arises, it is not 
sufficient under article 25 to afford individual members of such communities the individual right to vote in 
                                                          
78 ICCPR, entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 25. 
79 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 21. 
80 Ibid 
81 ICCPR, entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 2.  
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general elections. Some forms of local, regional or cultural autonomy may be called for in order to comply 
with the requirement of effective rights of participation.82 
Scheinin’s argument is in conformity with the authoritative interpretation of the UN Human Rights 
Committee in GC No. 23 and GC No. 25, which follows the same line of thought about minorities’ 
public participation. The Committee states in General Comment No. 23: 
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27 […] the enjoyment of those rights 
may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of 
members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.83  
The UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 25 is more concerned with facilitating 
the access of minorities to participatory mechanisms by promoting electoral facilities that can be 
used by all minority groups.84 In this regard, states should take positive measures to remove the 
obstacles for the effective participation of individuals who belong to national minorities. For 
example, states should use minority languages on voting ballots and provide education and 
information necessary for voting in the areas where minorities live. It is only through such positive 
measures that the very essence of the exercise of the right to political participation which is the, 
“reflection of everyone’s will,” can be realised in relation to national minorities. Thus, special 
measures to facilitate the political participation of national minorities seem to be a necessity for 
the political participation of national minorities without which the essence of the general right to 
political participation, which is the reflection of the will of everyone, might be impaired. Besides, 
one can argue that these measures are not to be understood as a more favourable treatment of 
members of minority groups. Indeed, such measures do not add to the substance of the general 
right to public participation, rather, these measures are to be seen as means to remove the obstacles 
that individuals belonging to national minorities, unlike the majority population, encounter for the 
exercise of their right to political rights.  
The prohibition of discrimination has major implications in relation to the political participation 
of national minorities. The prohibition of discrimination, based on the listed grounds in Article 2 
                                                          
82 Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, UN Human Rights Committee, views adopted 25 July 2000, UN Doc.  
CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996, appendix 
83 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, 8 April 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para 
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84 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7. 12 July 1996, 
para. 12. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
24 
 
of ICCPR, is a principle in international law. Besides, the prohibition of discrimination based on 
the ground of race enjoys a heightened status in international law and is considered as an obligation 
erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction case.85 The principle of non-discrimination as ICJ 
contemplated in the Barcelona Traction case considers the prohibition of racial discrimination 
among the customary principles of human rights, which protect the very core of human dignity.86 
However, the Court only considers racial discrimination as obligation erga omnes that its 
infringement is an action amounting to a violation of the dignity of the human being.87  
Although ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case considers racial discrimination as one of the 
peremptory norms, it is difficult to argue that the concept of race does not include ethnicity. In this 
respect, Article 1.1 of ICERD defines racial discrimination as, “any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.”88In addition, 
the travaux préparatoires89of ICCPR also considers the term ‘ethnic’ as including both racial and 
cultural characteristics pertaining to minority groups.90 It suggests that ethnicity and race are 
synonyms, and drawing a rigid distinction between them might lead to absurd consequences, such 
as leaving communities with different cultural characteristics unprotected.91 The view of the 
United Kingdom in the fifty-eighth meeting of the sub-commission on prevention of 
discrimination and protection of minorities was that, “the word ethnic seemed to be more 
appropriate, as it referred to the entire biological, cultural and historical heritage of an individual 
or a group whereas racial referred only to the physical aspects of such a heritage.”92 The chairman 
of the meeting also supported this view.93 Regarding the general right to political participation, 
differential treatments leading to the exclusion of national minorities from participation in public 
decision-making institutions can be deemed to fall under the category of racial discrimination.  
                                                          
85 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ, 5 February 1970, p. 32.  
86 Ibid 
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88 ICERD, entered into force 4 January 1969, Article 1.1. 
89 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 27 January 1980, Article 31 and Article 32. According to Article 
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90 UN Economic and Social Council, Summary of the 48th Meeting, 16 January 1950, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.48, 
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91 Economic and Social Council. Report of the Third Session of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
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In addition to the centrality of the prohibition of discrimination based on race and ethnicity in 
international law. Political participation is also an effective instrument for eliminating 
discrimination against ethnic identities because it affords those communities the ability to 
influence public decisions which might affect them. The ICERD is more explicit about political 
participation in light of the principle of non-discrimination. Article 5(c) of CERD requires states 
to undertake measures to tackle discrimination along the lines of ethnicity, age, gender, etc. and 
reaffirms that one of the means to do so is to ensure political rights, such as participation in 
elections based on internationally recognised electoral principles of equal and universal suffrage.94  
One of the contributions of ICERD to the principle of non-discrimination is that it requires states 
to take measures in forms of positive discrimination to empower disadvantaged individuals 
belonging to minority groups. Article 1(4) of CERD states:  
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic 
groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or 
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed 
racial discrimination […].95 
Over-emphasis on formal equal treatment can lead to de facto inequality through negligence to 
remove structural obstacles for facilitating the right to political participation of members of a 
national minority group. Here, non-discrimination as an overarching principle of international law 
can serve as an important legal principle for the interpretation of the right to political participation 
of persons belonging to a national minority. It is in this regard that the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in a report adopted in 1947 states:  
Protection of minorities is the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for equality 
of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic 
characteristics which […] distinguish them from the majority of the population.96 
3.3.2. The Council of Europe  
The main instrument for the protection of human rights within the CoE is the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR). It did not contain any provision on the universal right to 
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participation in the public affairs in the first place until the Protocol No. 1 was added to the 
convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR provides for the right to political participation 
through participation in elections. Article 3 of Protocol No.1 (hereinafter P1.3) states, “The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature.”97 
The formulation of the right to political participation, as reflected in P1.3 of the ECHR, is different 
from the formulation of the similar right in ICCPR in several ways. Firstly, although participation 
through voting is an essential component of genuine democracy, political participation is not 
limited to voting. In other words, the wording of P1.3 does not contain any explicit reference to 
political participation through representation or the right to directly participate in the political life 
of a state by standing as candidates in elections. Nonetheless, this became further elaborated by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which does not consider political participation 
limited to the act of voting and extends it to encompass representative means of participation by, 
“standing for election.”98  
Secondly, the text of P1.3 only refers to the election to choose members of the legislature, and it 
excludes other organs of state, such as the administrative bodies. It is evident that this Article does 
not entitle individuals to the right to participate in public affairs beyond the legislative bodies, such 
as administration body of the state if the constitution of the respective country does not provide 
for it.  
The Convention as a whole lacks reference to the term minority except in Articles 14 of ECHR as 
well as Article 1 of Protocol No.12 to ECHR. These articles prohibit any differential treatment for 
the purpose of the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in ECHR based on, inter alia, belonging to 
a national minority group.99 However, the Convention lacks explicit reference to minority groups 
beyond the prohibition of discrimination. Such absence of reference to minority groups is 
especially crucial regarding guaranteeing the right to freedom of culture of persons belonging to 
                                                          
97 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force 18 
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minorities, which could be taken into account for the interpretation of the right to political 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities. However, democracy which political 
participation can be presumed to be its beating heart has a principal status in ECHR as the preamble 
of the Convention states:  
Reaffirming […] belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the 
world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a 
common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend.100 
The rulings of ECtHR subsequently elaborated the idea of effective political democracy. As 
reflected in the preamble of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the protection of human rights 
and effective political democracy go hand in hand. The Court considers P1.3 of ECHR as, “[a] 
principle that is characteristic of an effective political democracy” and of, “prime importance in 
the Convention system.”101 In this respect, democratic governance is an underlying principle for 
the effective implementation of the Convention, and this has consistently been referred to in the 
Strasbourg Court rulings.102 Therefore, democracy can have the status of a general principle of the 
regional international law in the CoE because the right to political participation, as the cornerstone 
of democracy, is considered by the Court as a fundamental feature of the European public order, 
and the only political model compatible with ECHR.103   
In this regard, because the specific situation and concerns of persons belonging to national minority 
groups differ from those of the majority, an inclusive democratic system which allows for the 
plurality of political interests should facilitate the access of national minorities to means of political 
participation. This can be done if individuals belonging to national minorities ca vote for their 
representatives or stand as a candidate of their community in a non-discriminatory fashion. The 
ECtHR highlights the value of pluralism as an integral element of the kind of democracy that is 
compatible with the Convention. In other words, the Strasbourg Court acknowledges that 
                                                          
100 ECHR, entered into force 3 September 1953, Preamble 
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pluralism, as the integral value of political democracy, is not compatible with the exclusion of 
national minorities in relation to their right to political participation.104 For instance, in Sedjic and 
Finci, the Court finds a violation of P1.3 in conjunction with article 14 of ECHR. The Court holds 
that the differential treatment regarding the ineligibility of the representatives of other national 
communities to stand in elections of the House of People and the Presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was not compatible with the requirements of a pluralist democracy that is built on 
the value of diversity and the principle of non-discrimination.105  
The materials of legal assessment for the Strasbourg Court in cases related to the political 
participation of minorities are the general right to political participation as enshrined in P1.3 and 
the principle of non-discrimination as enshrined in Article 14 of ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 12106 to ECHR. Also, the principle of democratic governance in a plural manner, as stated in 
the preamble of ECHR, has become a consistent theme for the Court in deciding the cases before 
it. The provisions mentioned above constitute the foundation for the protection of the right to 
political participation of individuals belonging to national minorities, which can be legally 
enforced by individuals before the Court when CoE member states fail to meet their obligation.  
The Court, however, has been more conservative with matters related to the mechanisms and 
procedures of political participation, which might structurally limit or even undermine the ability 
of national minorities to exercise their right to public participation. For example, In Yumak and 
Sadak case, the Court adopted a limited, conservative approach regarding the issue of minimum 
electoral thresholds107 (this will discussed in more detail later in chapter 6). Nonetheless, the Court 
in other contexts adopts views which seem to be promising for an analysis of the right to political 
participation of national minorities. Concerning the issue of de facto discrimination, the Court 
considers equality of the treatment of two persons or groups of individuals while their situations 
are considerably different is discriminatory. In lights of the Court jurisprudence, the issue of 
                                                          
104 Timishev v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 13 December 2005, Applications Nos. 
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indirect discrimination has been addressed in the Thlimmenos case, and in the D.H. and others 
case in which the Court acknowledges that equal treatment of individuals whose situation 
considerably differs from that of others might result in indirect discrimination.108 However, ECtHR 
fails to adopt the same approach to the issue of minorities’ representation in Turkey in Yumak and 
Sadak.  
It is essential to consider that imposing a one-size-fits-all approach to the political participation of 
minorities by the Court will not be a fruitful approach. However, the importance of political 
participation of minorities for the preservation of minorities’ cultural identities seems to be more 
compatible with the spirit of ECHR. In this regard, the principles of democracy and respect for 
pluralism in lights of the principle of non-discrimination should be a guide for the assessment of 
the mechanisms designed for political participation in order to adequately protect the content of 
P1.3 for individuals belonging to national minorities. This kind of assessment seems to be absent 
in the Court’s judgement in Yumak and Sadak.   
The FCNM is another legally-binding treaty within the regional system of the CoE that deals 
specifically with issues concerning national minorities. Both the preamble of FCNM and 
explanatory report to FCNM clarify that the Convention was the CoE attempt to transform the 
political obligations of CSCE/OSCE documents regarding minorities into legally-binding 
standards.109 The Convention has a monitoring body (ACFC) which together with the Committee 
of Ministers of the CoE are responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention 
provisions through country-specific reports, and along with thematic reports on particular, 
concurrent areas of concern to minorities.110 There is no complaint mechanism to allow individuals 
or groups to lodge a complaint against member states. Also, ACFC works in cooperation with the 
Committee of Ministers, which is a political organ to monitor the implementation of the 
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Convention provisions.111 Even though a political organ monitors the Convention (the Committee 
of Ministers), the Convention has a legally-binding character.112  
 Article 15 of FCNM, explicitly refers to the right to public participation of national minorities, 
including participation in the political life of the hosting state. The importance of public 
participation within in FCNM is supported by the adoption of a Commentary on Article 15 by the 
Advisory Committee, which is exclusively concerned with the Effective Participation of Persons 
Belonging to National Minorities. In this regard, the Advisory Committee assigns a central role to 
article 15 of FCNM and considers it as, “an indicator of the level of democracy and pluralism of 
society.”113  
There is no doubt that according to the principle of equality and non-discrimination the right to 
political participation can be well guaranteed for everyone without any distinction based on, inter 
alia, affiliation with a national minority group.114 This represents the normative equality between 
citizens concerning political participation, which is based on the traditional principle of one-
person, one-vote. Also, democracy and pluralism as the only political ideas which are compatible 
with ECHR require that although the majority has a significant influence on democratic systems, 
it does not mean that the voice of national minorities due to their numerical weakness can be 
disregarded. Furthermore, the fundamental right of persons belonging to minorities to freely enjoy 
and practice their culture intensifies the protection of national minorities’ participation in the 
political life to be able to have an influence on matters, which directly or indirectly, affect their 
cultural identity.115 In this regard, the Advisory Committee considers Articles 4, 5, and 15 of 
FCNM as the backbones of the catalogue of minorities’ rights which lay the foundations of FCNM. 
These articles respectively deal with the right to equality, the responsibility of states to promote 
conditions for the development of minorities’ identity, and the right to participation in public 
life.116  
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ACFC considers the right to effective participation as a right that enables minorities to preserve 
their identity as enshrined in Article 5 of FCNM. Besides, it allows individuals who belong to 
national minority groups to enjoy full equality as enshrined in Art 4 of FCNM. Thus, two principal 
aims of the Convention can become realised through the right to political participation of national 
minorities without which neither full equality nor the preservation of the cultural identity of 
national minorities’ can be achieved.117 Therefore, political participation of national minorities as 
a right entitles individuals belonging to national minorities to political participation in a non-
discriminatory manner along the line of their cultural identity. It requires not only recognition and 
non-interference with the exercise of the right to political participation but also affirmative 
measures to enable national minorities to have an influence on matters which are of cultural 
importance to them.  
3.3.3. Public Participation of National Minorities through the Lens of CSCE/OSCE 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was founded in 1973 as a 
multilateral forum for states negotiations. After the 1994 Budapest Summit, the Conference 
continued its work under the new name of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). The primary concern of CSCE was the establishment of a channel for talks and 
cooperation between former East-West blocks during the Cold War. There were fundamental 
changes in the working of CSCE/OSCE in terms of increasing emphasis on human rights and 
minority issues, during the conferences held in the late 80s and the early 90s. The first references 
to the protection of national minorities were made in principle VII of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
which states: 
 The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons 
belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, and protect their legitimate 
interests in this sphere. 118 
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 In this regard, the concept of the human dimension introduced in the concluding document of the 
1989 Vienna meeting in which member states made non-legal commitments concerning the 
protection of human rights and national minorities.119  
One of the most critical documents of CSCE/OSCE which dedicates considerable attention to the 
protection of minorities, including the right to public participation, is the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document on the human dimension.120 The Copenhagen Document later became the primary 
source of inspiration for the UN Minority Declaration and FCNM, which both contain provisions 
on the political participation of individuals who belong to national minorities.121  
In the 1992 Helsinki summit participating states reaffirmed their determination to implement their 
commitments in the Vienna Concluding Document and the Copenhagen Document relating to the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In this regard, the 1992 Helsinki Document 
reiterates the importance of the right of persons belonging to national minorities, “to participate 
fully, in accordance with the democratic decision-making procedures of each State, in the political 
[…] decision-making and consultative at the national, regional and local level, inter alia, through 
political parties and associations”.122 In this context, the CSCE/OSCE highlights the importance 
of strengthening the viability of democratic governments for realising objectives, such as conflict 
prevention and the creation of confidence between people and the governments. Also, the member 
states emphasised the vital role of plural democracy, which allows national minorities to 
participate in the national decision-making processes.123 
Following the emphasis that the Vienna Concluding Document and the Copenhagen Document 
put on minorities issues, in the 1992 Helsinki summit, member states established the Office of the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The primary role of the Office is to provide 
early warning about tensions involving national minority issues.124Thus, the Office designed as, 
“an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.”125 After the establishment of 
HCNM, the Office took substantial steps toward the development, better clarification, and better 
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implementation of international law standards regarding minority rights in different areas, 
including the right of minorities to participate in public and political decision-making. These 
attempts were in the form of thematic recommendations regarding recurrent issues in member 
states that the High Commissioner had faced in his work. The most important recommendations 
are the Lund Recommendations, the Oslo Recommendations, and the Hague Recommendations 
which are concerned with the effective participation of national minorities in public life, the 
linguistic rights and the education rights of persons belonging to national minorities, respectively.   
 The bodies of CSCE/OSCE as well as the recommendations and reports issued under the mandate 
of HCNM have no legally-binding effect and consequently, no capability for standard making. 
However, the human dimension of CSCE/OSCE, as reflected in the Vienna Concluding Document 
and preamble of 1990 Copenhagen Document, emphasises human rights, protection of minorities, 
and democracy as the principles of the new order of Europe after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.126 In this regard, the Copenhagen Document reminds member states of their obligations 
under international human rights treaties, which they are bound to respect and protect.127 The same 
approach reflected in the thematic recommendations, introduced by the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities. In this regard, the Lund Recommendations contain a set of guidelines 
which are either compiled from the already existing international standards with further 
specifications or contain proposals that have been identified as a response to a general pattern of 
deficit in CSCE/OSCE member states.128 The Lund Recommendations aim to facilitate the 
protection of minorities’ participation in the conduct of public affairs and for that purpose draw 
upon already existing standards in international law.129  
Even though the documents adopted by the CSCE/OSCE are not legally-binding, the workings of 
OSCE organs and the HCNM have had a decisive influence on the development of minority 
protection in European regional system.130 As was mentioned earlier, the CSCE/OSCE has 
contributed to further elaboration of legal standards concerning the protection of national 
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minorities, especially in co-operation with the CoE and the adoption of FCNM in 1995.131 Such 
influence is significant considering the precedent efforts of some CoE member states, such as 
Austria in 1993, which tried to add a protocol to ECHR concerning the rights of individuals 
belonging to minorities but failed to succeed.132  
 In 1991 member states agreed under the Moscow Document that the principle of non-intervention 
is not applicable in cases related to the human dimension.133 Consequently, the issues related to 
minorities and human rights become issues of international concern which state sovereignty is 
non-applicable and can lead to reporting measures under the Moscow mechanism regarding 
violations in member states. This mechanism can be requested by any of OSCE member states 
even if the host state denies as long as five other states support the initiative to establish a country 
mission consisting of rapporteurs.134 In this regard, although the commitments, made within the 
CSCE/OSCE framework, lack a legally-binding status, they are politically binding and have 
contributed to the international norm-setting, especially in the context of the CoE.135  
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4. Mechanisms for Political Participation of National Minorities 
4.1. Effective and Plural Participation 
There is not any provision in hard law sources of international law in favour of any special 
mechanism to facilitate political participation of national minorities. Nonetheless, the provisions 
of Article 25 of ICCPR and the communications before the UN Human Rights Committee of 
ICCPR, as well as P1.3 and the case law of ECtHR, emphasise the centrality of electoral processes 
in democratic states. The principal expectation from electoral systems is that they should be 
capable of reflecting the opinion of people in the choice of their representatives.136  
The minimum legal standards as guaranteed in P1.3 of ECHR and Article 25 of ICCPR are that 
every citizen in a non-discriminatory fashion can participate in the conduct of the state and the 
mechanism of elections should be capable of reflecting the opinions of people. Therefore, apart 
from the duty of states to hold free and periodic elections, individuals’ right to political 
participation should be guaranteed in the form of the right to free elections.137 The Strasbourg 
Court, in light of the minimum legal guarantee of P1.3 of ECHR, holds that states cannot thwart, 
“the free expression of opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”138 In fact, even if 
states apply measures under their margin of discretion, these measures cannot aim at restricting 
the application of P1.3 for members of national minority groups.139  
 Also, FCNM, which exclusively deals with minority rights, holds the same general approach 
regarding political participation of members of national minority groups. ACFC adopts the view 
that any standard making regarding political participation of minorities should be cautious to 
domestic complexities of each state and avoid a one-size-fits-all approach.140 Therefore, 
appropriation of mechanisms for political participation of minorities should be done in a case by 
case and need-based manner. As Asbjørn Eide, the author of the commentary to the UN Minorities 
Declaration, states, “it is essential that the state consult the minorities on what would constitute 
                                                          
136 Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia (Communication No. 314/1988), UN Human Rights Committee, views adopted 14 July 
1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988, Para. 6.6. See Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, European Court of 
Human Rights, para. 50. 
137 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 2 March 1987, 
Application No. 9267/81, para. 51. 
138 Ibid, para. 52 
139 Ibid, Gitonas and others v. Greece, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 1 July 1997,  Application Nos. 
18747/91; 19376/92 ; 19379/92, para. 44.  
140  ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, 5 May 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para. 148.  
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appropriate measures, different minorities might have different needs that must be taken into 
account.”141 It is in this regard that due attention should be given to mechanisms of political 
participation, to examine whether they are capable of protecting the exercise of the right to political 
participation for national minorities. In other words, structural problems can place a de facto 
restriction on the meaningful realisation of the right to political participation as a guaranteed right. 
In this respect, the failure of states to take positive measures impedes individuals to have an 
influence on public decision-making to preserve their culture and protect their interests.142 It is 
stated in the Explanatory report on FCNM that state parties have, “a measure of discretion in the 
implementation of the objectives which they have undertaken to achieve, thus enabling them to 
take particular circumstances into account.”143 Thus, the focus has been on the compliance with 
general and fundamental international law standards regarding internal processes of decision-
making, which directly or indirectly, affects national minorities in a case by case manner.144  
Generally speaking, states should meet the minimum legal requirements, as stated in article 25 of 
ICCPR and P1.3 of ECHR regarding holding free elections. However, the distinct situation of 
minorities concerning the exercise of the right to public participation and the importance of this 
right for the preservation of minority culture should be taken into account in order to give the right 
to public participation an effective content for members of minority groups. In this regard, three 
characteristics can be identified in the case law before the Strasbourg Court, which are important 
in relation to the right to political participation of national minorities.  
First, one of the well-established legal principles, which can help to protect better the right to 
public participation of persons belonging to minorities, is the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination. Indirect discrimination refers to discriminatory results which are caused by 
equality of treatment. In other words, mere equality of treatment can lead to discrimination when 
two persons or groups of individuals have significantly different situations. The Court, in the 
Thlimmenos case, finds a violation of the content of Article 14, when a neutral law can have a 
                                                          
141 Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights 
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detrimental impact on the rights of some individuals. Indirect discrimination and the removal of 
structural disadvantages faced by national minorities can be a basis for the justification of the need 
for special measures to facilitate political participation of individuals belonging to minorities. In 
this regard, minorities’ political participation in the context of pluralistic democracy overlaps with 
the duty of states to protect the cultural identity of minorities through promoting, “[the] opportunity 
for contribution from those who are affected by public decision-making.”145  
Second, the idea of democratic pluralism developed in the Strasbourg Court case law has 
implications for to the general duty of states to be inclusive concerning, inter alia, the participation 
of national minorities in the political life of the state. In this regard, the importance of pluralism as 
the hallmark of democracy has been emphasised persistently by the Strasbourg Court.146 
 Third, the idea of the effectiveness of rights means that the exercise of individual human rights 
should find a concrete meaning in real life. Regarding the exercise of the right by individuals who 
belong to national minorities, states should adopt measures to actualize the reflection of the 
political voices of national minorities. In this respect, the Strasbourg Court in the Soering case 
reiterates the need for effective and meaningful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in the 
Convention. The Court in its reasoning, which is in conformity with the provisions of Article 31.1 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,147 states that the Convention provisions should 
be interpreted and applied in a manner to make its safeguards practical and effective, rather than 
illusory and theoretical.148 The effective implementation of the rights of individuals who belong 
to minorities is a guiding principle, which might require different affirmative measures based on 
the specific circumstances of minorities in each state. They might range from lowering the 
minimum thresholds in proportional electoral systems to facilitate the representation of national 
minorities to guarantying seats designated to minority representatives in the national parliaments. 
                                                          
145 See CSCE/OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1 September 1999, p. 6. 
146 Handyside v. United Kingdom,European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 7 December 1976, Application No. 
5493/72, para. 49. See mutatis mutandis Izzettin Dogan and others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 
Judgement of 26 July 2016, Application No. 62649 /10, para. 109 
147 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 27 January 1980, Article 31.1. 
148 Soering v. the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 7 July 1989, Application No. 
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However, none of the measure mentioned above can automatically lead to the violation of the 
content of the right to political participation of individuals who belong to national minorities.  
The following sections will examine in more detail how a right to political participation of 
minorities can be effectively guaranteed through electoral systems, which are the most common 
ways of public participation.  
4.2. Accountable Representation  
The right to political participation of national minorities necessitates their inclusion into the 
decision-making bodies, such as legislative bodies. National Minorities’ inclusion means that such 
inclusion should be through a process of voting and representation by individuals who belong to 
national minorities. 
In this regard, the representatives of a national minority group act on behalf of a minority group 
and are accountable to those who have elected him (the idea of democratic franchise). Indeed, 
there should be a link between the representative of a minority group and a minority group. This 
link is established through individuals who vote for a candidate on a special minority voter register. 
Therefore, it is by means of such a relationship that a representative can be considered accountable 
to individuals who belong to a national minority group for the reflection of minorities’ demands 
in decision-making bodies. 
Only accountable representation of national minority groups allows for the promotion of 
minorities’ identity in an elected body.149 In this regard, political participation of national 
minorities is meaningful only when persons belonging to a minority community can elect their 
representatives who are accountable for their representation, and their assignment or reassignment 
depends on the will of national minorities’ voters.150  
ACFC acknowledged the importance of the requirement of accountability in its first opinion on 
Hungary. ACFC noted the problem of the lack of link or accountability between the representatives 
of minorities and voters who chose the representatives.151 Namely, the national laws allowed 
people who did not belong to minorities to vote for persons that represent minorities. This had led 
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to a situation that harmed the credibility of the local minority self-government guaranteed by 
Hungarian law. In the second cycle of reports, the Advisory Committee welcomes the concrete 
measures taken by the Hungarian authorities to amend the previous deficits in the constitutional 
law regarding the lack of accountability link between the minority voters and their 
representatives.152 After the new constitutional amendments in Hungary, “only persons belonging 
to minorities will in future be able to elect their self-government […]”.153  
It seems that ACFC, apart from the requirement to belong to a minority group, recognises the 
accountability relationship as an essential requirement for the effective participation of national 
minorities in decision-making bodies. ACFC held the opinion that the safeguards towards 
establishing a firm relation of accountability between minority voters and persons who would 
represent them are of crucial importance not only for the legitimacy of those representatives but 
also for guaranteeing the right to political participation of minorities, which can meaningfully 
protect their interests and their cultural identity. 154  
4.3. The Ability to Influence 
It should be noted that the objective of the representation of minorities in decision-making bodies 
is to enable them to influence the results of decision-making, which directly or indirectly, affect 
them. In this regard, even if national minorities or their representatives are included in the decision-
making process and their views are considered and taken into account by majority their ability to 
influence and to have control over matters directly affecting their cultural life remains an important 
issue that we need to explore its legal implications. In this regard, the notion of pluralism in the 
democratic state and its correlation with the principle of subsidiarity become essential when we 
talk about democratic public participation.  
 As was previously mentioned, the Strasbourg has consistently held the opinion that pluralism is 
the, “hallmark of democracy,” and, “there can be no democracy without pluralism.”155 The idea of 
pluralism refers to the inclusion of all sectors of society in order to ensure the public will of all or 
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will of the people is genuinely reflected.156 Therefore, a democratic state not only reflects the will 
of the majority but also accommodates the will of a national minority population live within its 
jurisdiction.157 In this respect, the principle of subsidiarity goes hand in hand with pluralism, and 
it means that the concerns of those who are directly affected by the results of a decision should be 
considered in the process of decision-making.158  
One can argue that the effective exercise of the right to political participation by individuals who 
belong to national minorities is dependent on the degree their concerns become considered in 
national decision-making, which directly affect their identities and interests. In this regard, the 
respect for minorities’ right to freely enjoy their culture by non-interference of governments can 
only be sufficient if governments take positive measures to place matters which might directly 
affect national minorities under their scrutiny in national decision-making processes. This 
approach is also reiterated in the Explanatory Report of FCNM, which highlights the participation 
of national minorities in decision-making is important, especially when Parties are contemplating 
legislation or administrative measures likely to affect national minorities directly.159  
In this regard, when the very cultural identity of national minorities is affected, persons belonging 
to a national minority group should have the opportunity to affect the public decisions. Therefore, 
the very core of minorities’ right to political participation is to enable them to decide over matters, 
                                                          
156 Although decision-making based on the majoritarian consensus is the core of democratic governance, it should be 
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which might directly, affect the exercise of the right to cultural identity as guaranteed in Article 
27 of ICCPR.  
The UN Human Rights Committee deals with the issue of subsidiarity in several communications 
on the alleged violation of Article 27 of ICCPR in respect of states legislations, which affected the 
cultural lifestyle of an indigenous people. Bearing in mind that the protection of indigenous people 
is another institution of international law, it has important implications for national minorities’ 
political participation. The UN Human Rights Committee reiterated the importance of the principle 
of subsidiarity or making public decisions in close consultation with those who are directly 
affected. The Committee, in Länsman, considered the fact that the affected Sami community in 
Finland was properly consulted and the views of its representatives were taken into account before 
launching a quarrying project, which allegedly had disrupted the traditional reindeer-herding 
activities of Sami people in Finland.160 
Similarly, the Committee, in Apirana Mahuika, considered the process of close communication 
between the state and minorities more explicitly. The Committee concluded that because state 
legislation regarding fishing activities of Maori population preceded comprehensive and 
meaningful negotiations with those affected, there was no violation of the provisions of Article 27 
of ICCPR.161 The Human rights Committee considerations imply that with the inclusion of Sami 
and Maori people in the process of the decision-making, the concerned states discharged their 
obligation of allowing affected communities to participate in national decision-making that 
directly affects them (which is a translation of the principle of subsidiarity). Therefore, the essence 
of the right to public participation of persons who belong to national minority groups is their ability 
to influence public decisions, which directly affect them. In this respect, states should give due 
diligence to ensure that national minority communities can effectively participate in 
communications and negotiations with the government through their representatives when national 
decision-making affect them. 
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5. The Scope of Public Participation 
5.1. Political Life: Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Bodies of Government  
The international human rights law instruments do not contain any clear reference to the scope of 
the right to political participation except for P1.3 of ECHR, which explicitly formulates the right 
to political participation as a right to vote in the legislature.162 The formulation of the right to 
political participation in ICCPR is, however, very general and does not limit participation to any 
particular sector of the state. Article 25(a) of ICCPR holds that every citizen has the right, “to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through chosen representatives.”163 Furthermore, 
in a similar manner to Article 25 of ICCPR regarding the scope of participation, Art 5(c) of ICERD 
holds that state parties shall guarantee, “the enjoyment of the right to vote in elections and to stand 
for election … to take part in the government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level 
and to have equal access to public service.”164 Therefore, in contrast to P1.3 of ECHR, the scope 
of participation seems to be wider in the perspectives of ICCPR and ICERD, in a sense that the 
relevant provisions of the two conventions do not refer to a right to participation in a specific body 
of states, such as the legislative or the administrative.165  
Generally speaking, the right to public participation through periodical elections should be 
extended to members of national minorities in terms of their equal right to vote and to stand as 
candidates on equal terms with the majority population. However, unlike the relevant provisions 
of ICERD and ICCPR; Art 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
seems to limit the right to vote and to stand in elections to legislature of member states.  
It seems that ECHR has a limited approach to the scope of the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate. According to the Travaux Préparatoires of ECHR, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 refers 
only to, “legislature, or at least of one of its chambers if it has two or more.”166 However, in the 
subsequent case law of the Court, it becomes evident that the scope of the participatory right, 
exercised through the channel of elections, is not limited to the legislature in a strict sense. 
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According to decisions made by the former European Commission, legislative powers are not 
limited only to the national parliaments.167 In this regard, the Court distinguished regulative powers 
(as distinct from law-making) from legislative powers 168and reiterated the former Commission 
opinion that the legislative power is not necessarily limited to national parliaments.169 Therefore, 
the scope of the right to vote becomes limited to those positions that have law-making powers, and 
in order to determine what state body exercise the legislative authority, the constitutional structure 
of the state concerned shall be analysed.170  
Concerning the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, it seems evident that the Court determines the 
legislative power of a state organ in the background of the national constitution of the state 
concerned to determine the scope of the right to free elections. Therefore, the Court reiterates that 
the provisions of P1.3 of ECHR include presidential elections if the office of the president has the 
power to legislate or has the power to control the passage of legislation.171  
The term legislature in P1.3 can be taken as an official position or organ with the ability to make 
decisions by which the interests of citizens, directly or indirectly, are affected. For instance, the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt case stated, “the word 
legislature does not necessarily mean only the national parliament, however; it has to be interpreted 
in the light of the constitutional structure of the State in question.”172 
The Court, in the Matthews case, extends the ambit of P1. 3 of ECHR to the European Parliament, 
in addition to the ‘national legislature’ as stated in P1.3. According to the facts of the case, 
Gibraltar is part of the United Kingdom overseas territory that is not part of the United Kingdom 
in domestic terms. Based on the United Kingdom’s declaration of 23 October 1953, ECHR became 
applicable to Gibraltar. Subsequently, the Protocol No. 1 to ECHR became applicable to Gibraltar 
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after 25 February 1988 UK declaration.173 Therefore, the United Kingdom has jurisdiction within 
the meaning of Article 1 of ECHR.174 In addition,  the United Kingdom under article 227 (4) of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community has accepted, in many areas, the applicability of 
the European Commission legislation to Gibraltar.175 Although the legislature in Gibraltar was the 
House of Assembly and P1.3 could be applied only in relation to the elections of house of assembly 
the court held, “[…] there was no basis upon which the Convention could place obligations on 
Contracting Parties in relation to elections for the parliament of a distinct, supranational 
organization […]”.176 The Court further states, “to accept the Government’s contention that the 
sphere of activities of the European Parliament falls outside the scope of Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 would risk undermining one of the fundamental tools by which, “effective political democracy,” 
can be maintained.”177  
One can conclude the hierarchal importance of public participation in the pyramid below, based 
on the emphasis which the Strasbourg Court puts on the legislative authority, and the inherent 
importance of legislation in democratic governance in the case law of ECtHR.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                          Hierarchy of Participation  
The pyramid is ordered in lights of the criterion of disinterestedness, which means by moving 
upwards from the bottom the decisions taken in corresponding bodies become less concerned with 
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the interests of citizens in terms of allocation of rights and duties.178 In other words, the executive 
and the judicial sectors actualise or protect the already taken decisions by legislative bodies, which 
are preoccupied with the task of communicating different interests and views to reach a coherent 
decision for legislation.179Therefore, it can be concluded that the scope for political participation 
is determined by the competency of a state body for law-making.  
5.2. States’ Margin of Discretion vis-à-vis the Essence of Public Participation  
Political participation in the sense of participation in elections constitutes the heart of democratic 
governance. The importance of democratic governance for the protection of human rights is 
reflected not only in the preamble of ECHR but also in the Strasbourg Court jurisprudence, which 
considers democracy, “[as] one of the cornerstones of the European Convention system”180 and a 
fundamental element of, “the European public order.”181 Also, democracy cannot be genuine 
without respecting the value of pluralism.182 From the democratic point of view, the idea of 
democratic franchise requires that all nationals who are affected by laws should have the 
possibility to participate in legislative institutions. Individuals who belong to a national minority 
group need to participate in law-making processes which might affect the preservation of their 
cultural identity. 
The right of minorities to exercise and preserve their culture, as guaranteed in Article 27 of ICCPR, 
gives a special characteristic to the right to public participation of minorities. The protection of 
minorities’ culture requires their participation in decision-making institutions of the hosting states 
in order to be able to influence public decisions which affect their cultural identity. In this context, 
as Martin Scheinin points out, specific positive measures to facilitate public participation for 
national minorities might be necessary if any right to participation in public life is to be enjoyed 
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by them.183 In fact, although there cannot be any one-size-fits-all approach regarding mechanisms 
and positive measures to facilitate the right to public participation of persons belonging to 
minorities, the essence of the right to public participation should always ensure that they have the 
possibility to be represented in decision-making, which directly concerns them. 
 In this regard, the Explanatory Report to FCNM states that Article 15, “leave the States concerned 
a measure of discretion in the implementation of the objectives, which they have undertaken to 
achieve, thus enabling them to take particular circumstances into account.”184 Nonetheless, the 
Commentary of the Advisory Committee on Article 15 of FCNM highlights the need-based 
characteristic of the mechanisms adopted to facilitate the right to political participation for 
minorities. Indeed, ACFC highlights the need for constant reassessment of adopted measures 
regarding minorities’ participation in an evolutionary fashion to ensure the effective public 
participation of national minorities is realised. 185 ACFC does not clarify what measures are to be 
taken by member states, regarding Article 15 of FCNM. However, the Commentary on Article 15 
of FCNM implies that state responsibility can be triggered if negligence to take positive measure 
could impair the exercise of the right to public participation by individuals who belong to national 
minorities. In this regard, the Advisory Committee notes that “[although] measures taken by state 
parties may be considered satisfactory in a given stage […] it does not ensure that they will be 
sufficient to ensure compliance with the standards of the Framework Convention in the future.”186 
It is evident that ACFC considers the participation of national minorities in political life as an 
obligation of result, which might require positive measures to be taken by a member state if the 
meaningful exercise of this right requires.  
Similarly, the universal right to political participation, as enshrined in P1.3 of ECHR and Article 
25 of ICCPR, leaves states with a wide margin of discretion.187 The Strasbourg Court has been 
                                                          
183 Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia (Communication No. 760/1996), UN Human Rights Committee, views adopted 25 
July 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996, Appendix.  
184 CoE, Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 February 1998, 
para. 11.  
185 ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, 5 May 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, paras. 148-150. 
186 ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, 5 May 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para. 149. 
187 See for example Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 2 March 
1987, Application no. 9267/81, para. 52; Crippa et al. v. France (Communication No. 993/2001, 995/2001), UN 
Human Rights Committee, Decision of 28 October 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/993-995/2001, para. 4.10. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
47 
 
very conservative about clarifying the content of the right to political participation of individuals 
belonging to national minorities, which have practically resulted in a dependency on states 
discretion how to implement their participatory mechanisms.188 This lack of clarity might run the 
danger of leaving the right to public participation for individuals belonging to minorities 
ineffective. The ambiguity of the content of the right to public participation for individuals who 
belong to national minorities is a gap which can be filled by recourse to existing normative 
principles of international law to find a more solid ground for the protection of minorities’ right to 
public participation.189 There are two important points which should be considered in assessing 
the outlines of national minorities’ right to participate in the political life of a state. 
 Firstly, the very core of the right to political participation, which is the right to vote and the right 
to stand in elections, cannot be arbitrarily suspended. As reiterated in ECtHR case law, although 
the right to political participation is not absolute and it might be subject to limitations those 
limitations should not be discriminatory, either directly or indirectly, in a way that impairs the right 
to public participation of certain individuals belonging to a minority group.190 Exclusion of 
minorities, either explicitly or covertly, is against the principle of universal suffrage as a 
guaranteed human right.191 In this respect, within the UN framework, the Human Rights 
Committee in GC No. 25 states the right to political participation, as guaranteed in the Covenant, 
“[…] may not be suspended or excluded except on the grounds that are established by law and that 
are objective and reasonable.”192 It means states have the obligation of non-interference with the 
exercise of voting rights of persons who belong to national minorities.  
Second, in addition to the negative obligations, mere equal treatment can have a counter effect on 
the exercise of the right to public participation of national minorities. In other words, numerical 
                                                          
188 Pentassuglia, Gaetano. "Monitoring Minority Rights in Europe: The Implementation Machinery of the Framework 
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International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 6, issue. 4, 1999, p. 418-420. 
189 Oppenheim, Lassa. Oppenheim's International Law, vol. 1, Peace: Parts 2 to 4. edited by Watts, Arthur, and 
Jennings, Robert, 1992. P.40.  
190 Hirst v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 6 October 2005 Application No. 
74025/01, para. 60.  
191 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 2 March 1987,  
Application No. 9267/81, para. 51. Hirst v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 6 
October 2005, Application No. 74025/01, para. 59.  
192 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, 12 July 1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para. 
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weakness and special needs of minority groups, such as the lack of knowledge of the official 
language by national minorities’ voters (if the only official language is used on voting ballots) can 
constitute conditions which might expose them to indirect discrimination. In fact, if one compares 
the situation of national minorities to that of the majority population, whose conditions are 
substantially different from persons belonging to national minority communities, the lack of 
intention for discriminating against a national minority group loses its credibility.193It is because 
mere equality of treatment regarding political participation of minorities can lead to their exclusion 
from political life and thus render their right to political participation ineffective. Therefore, states 
should take positive measures to facilitate minorities’ political participation as an effective right, 
rather than an illusory right.194 In this regard, the Strasbourg Court has consistently reiterated the 
wide margin of discretion regarding the design of electoral systems; however, this wide margin of 
discretion shall not undermine the effectiveness of the right to political participation for members 
of national minority groups.195  
Based on the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court one can argue that states have a wide margin of 
appreciation to adopt appropriate mechanisms for political participation which is more suitable for 
their, “historical development and cultural diversity.”196 If such mechanisms fail to be effective 
regarding meeting the needs of persons who belong to national minorities, states shall take 
affirmative measures in order to prevent thwarting the effective exercise of the right to 
participation by minorities. The Court, in the Hirst v. the United Kingdom case, concerning the 
discretion of states in relation to the design of the electoral systems, held, “they must reflect, or 
not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure 
aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage.”197 The logical consequence 
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April 2000 Application No. 34369/97, para. 44. 
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is that if mere equality of treatment cannot adequately realise the right to political participation for 
individuals belonging to minorities, affirmative measures should be taken to facilitate the exercise 
of their political participation.  
The issue of positive measures by states regarding mechanisms of political participation, however, 
does not directly engage states failure regarding the right to political participation by national 
minorities. The Strasbourg Court, in one of its judgements, states:  
It is […] for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been 
complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent 
as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness[…].198 
Moreover, the requirement of ‘constant review’ as required by ACFC indicates that the margin of 
discretion should be considered as a possibility for states to consider their domestic needs and 
circumstances. In other words, a wide margin of discretion cannot become an instrument for states 
to arbitrarily or unjustifiably compromise the right to public participation for individuals belonging 
to minorities.199 Indeed, states should ensure that existing participatory mechanisms are effective, 
and the lack of positive measures does not render the right to participation of individuals belonging 
to minorities an illusory right. It is in this regard that governments should constantly keep the 
existing participatory mechanisms under check to ensure they are capable of corresponding to the 
needs of the minority population, and can effectively protect the essence of the right guaranteed 
under article 15 of FCNM.200  
5.3. Legitimate Limitations to the Exercise of Public Participation 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda, as enshrined in article 31.1of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT), states that any interpretation of treaties should be in line with the 
principle of good faith, (pacta sunt servanda) and in light of the objectives of the respective 
treaty.201  Restrictions put on minority communities is justified, when it meets the principle of 
good faith enshrined in VCLT.  In other words, limitations cannot be arbitrary, should be in 
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accordance with the law and for the protection of other individuals’ rights. In this respect, 
limitations on political participation of a minority group might be due to cultural practices which 
are against the content of guaranteed individual rights.  
 Martin Scheinin examines the permissibility to grant political authority to certain cultural groups 
that violate the human rights of their members. He argues that within the human rights discourse 
the vertical relationship between individuals and state pertains to the obligation of states to ensure 
that third parties which states might have delegated certain functions of authority under the 
category of minority rights, respect and protect the human rights of their members.202  
 Therefore, states should give due consideration to the primary importance of individual human 
rights of the members of national minority groups, especially in the context of political 
participation. In other words, the quality of the internal structure of the group and its ability to 
protect equality and human rights of its members is an important matter in the context of political 
participation of national minorities. The Strasbourg Court in the Refah Partisi found it justifiable 
to restrict the activities of a political party due to its affiliation with a set of Islamic dogmas, which 
are not dynamic and could infringe the principle of non-discrimination and protection of human 
rights of individuals.203Therefore, when a minority group utilises democratic means to maintain 
an internal undemocratic structure, in relation to its members or imposes restrictions on the human 
rights of its member, states can legitimately apply restrictions on the political activities which aim 
to promote such practices.  
Also, the prevention of circumventing legal rules concerning the protection of national minority 
groups is another legitimate ground for limiting the political rights of a community, which claims 
a national minority status. It seems that the Court recognises a special position for national minority 
groups, regarding the right to political participation. The Court expresses awareness that 
communities with disputed national minority status might seek to overcome the rule of equality in 
order to gain facilitated access to political positions.204 These suspicious demands have been one 
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of the grounds by which the Court found it legitimate for states to introduce restrictions to protect 
the human rights of others.205  
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6. Electoral Systems and National Minorities’ Representation 
When minorities’ political participation using free elections is concerned, it can be useful to 
distinguish between two aspects of the right to free elections, namely, the active and the passive 
aspect of this right. The active aspect refers to the right of everyone to vote in the periodic and free 
elections. The passive aspect is concerned with the right of everyone to stand as a candidate in 
elections. From the perspective of minority rights, these two aspects require special considerations 
that need to be fulfilled to protect the substance of minorities’ right to political participation 
through elections.  
6.1. Active Aspect  
The active aspect of the right to free elections means that everyone should have the right to vote 
for his or her chosen candidate in free elections, which are governed by the principle of one-person, 
one-vote. This aspect of the voting right is mostly concerned with a range of affirmative measures 
that states should take to enable members of minority communities to exercise their right to public 
participation. The most important measures, which constitute a general good practice regarding 
the holding of elections, are listed in codes of good practices issued by organs, such as the Venice 
Commission, which is the advisory body of the CoE in electoral and constitutional matters, and 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of OSCE.  Among these good practices 
regarding the active aspect of voting, which can affect the voting rights of individuals belonging 
to national minorities, are printing the ballots and other important information in the language of 
minorities in addition to the official language of the state, 206and determining the constituency 
boundaries impartially to avoid any detrimental effect on the participation of national minorities.207 
Furthermore, states should provide civic education and voter information to national minority 
voters to learn about their rights, the purpose of democratic institutions, and the voting process in 
areas where they live and in a language used by them.208Also, states should provide individuals 
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who belong to national minorities with easy and equal access to voting stations, especially those 
national minority groups who are far from urban centres and live in marginal areas. 209 
It is worth mentioning that the listing of such measures does not imply that these measures are 
exhaustive. In fact, it emphasises their enabling importance for the minorities to be able to exercise 
their voting rights equally.  
Although the measures mentioned above are best practices and cannot engage states’ legal 
obligations directly, in certain circumstances, the lack of affirmative measures might cause 
deliberative negligence that can violate the right to political participation of minorities.  For 
example, deliberately decreasing the number of accessible polling sites in places where minority 
communities live or prohibiting electoral advertisements in minority languages can impair the 
essence of the right to political participation for persons belonging to national minorities.  
In this regard, the Human Rights Committee emphasises the importance of affirmative measures 
to overcome specific difficulties which might prevent persons belonging to minority groups to 
exercise their guaranteed right under article 25 of ICCPR.210 For instance, it is mentioned that state 
parties should include information on positive measures taken to remove such barriers regarding 
minorities’ right to political participation in their periodic reports.211 Therefore, the lack of 
concrete measures to facilitate the possibility of voting for individuals belonging to a minority 
group can, in certain circumstances, trigger the responsibility of states regarding the protection of 
the active aspect of the right to political participation. 
6.2. Passive Aspect 
The passive aspect of the right to public participation refers to the direct participation of individuals 
in the political process of their country to represent and follow the interests of their constituents in 
decision-making processes. From the perspective of minorities’ protection, it means that persons 
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who belong to a national minority group or individuals who make themselves accountable to stand 
as the representatives of national minorities in national decision-making forums. 
The representation of minorities in national parliaments or other elected bodies of states is an 
essential aspect of the universal right to vote in free elections. It is based on the simple, and 
principal notion of democratic franchise or accountability in democracies, which implies that an 
election is not free unless there is a link or connection between voters and representatives.212 In 
this regard, when candidates are restricted or banned to represent minorities’ identities the voters 
become disenfranchised.  
 
6.3. Design of Electoral Systems for Minorities’ Participation 
Electoral systems in the world, despite the variety in each state, can be categorised into two main 
categories of majority system and proportional system.213 The majority system allocates the seats 
to candidates or a list of candidates or a party that wins the majority of votes. The proportional 
system aims to ensure the fair reflection of political interests, through the distribution of the seats 
among candidates according to the votes they obtained. This system is the most widely used system 
among the CoE member states.  
Regarding the realisation of the effective right to political participation of individuals belonging 
to national minorities, elections, and electoral systems act as the gateways which enable 
individuals belonging to minorities to enter into public decision-making forums. As was earlier 
examined in this thesis, the current corpus of international law does not obligate states to design 
or alter their electoral systems to become more favourable to their national minorities. In fact, the 
right to stand as minorities’ candidate cannot be a basis to constitute another right to a particular 
electoral system which is more favourable for winning seats in the elected bodies for minorities.214 
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However, it does not imply that the essence of the right to political participation of minorities can 
be impaired by deliberately designing an electoral system which might subtly and structurally 
exclude minorities from public participation. In this regard, the GC No. 25 of the UN Human 
Rights Committee states that the committee does not require states to set any particular electoral 
system but whatever system is utilised by states, “it must guarantee and give effect to the free 
expression of the will of its electors.”215 In the same line of argument, the former European 
Commission of Human Rights declares that although a proportional system is more favourable to 
minority representation, it is within the discretion of state parties to decide on their electoral 
systems in general.216 
Regardless of the merits and disadvantages of each of these systems, the majority system or the 
proportional system, we will consider the implications of each system for the right to political 
participation of national minorities below.  
 
6.3.1. Proportional Systems 
The proportional system offers a better possibility for the participation of national minorities and 
facilitates the representation of minority communities.217 However, it should be taken into account 
that even though this electoral system is more suitable for the representation of smaller groups, it 
does not automatically guarantee the representation of minorities because the main impediment to 
the representation of minorities in the proportional system is the issue of minimum thresholds. 
Minimum thresholds ensure that only those parties or representatives can acquire seats which 
received the minimum percentage of votes determined in the electoral laws. Thresholds in 
proportional systems are necessary due to a fundamental need to avoid fragmentation in 
parliaments and to ensure cohesiveness in parliamentary decisions. 
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Minimum thresholds can become an obstacle for the representation of national minorities when a 
minority community has a small number of members to be able to meet the minimum threshold 
requirement. It can, in effect, lead to the exclusion and marginalisation of political voices of these 
small minorities, and subsequently, paralyse them to have any significant influence on public 
decisions which affects them.  
Despite the abovementioned consequences, there are no international law standards which provide 
for the exemption from thresholds for the representatives or the parties representing a national 
minority. The issue of thresholds is mainly left to the discretion of states because firstly, 
complexities of each state, concerning its electoral system, make it difficult for an international 
body to standardise electoral designs, which are dependent on domestic circumstances of each 
state. As the Strasbourg Court states, “the number of situations provided for in the legislation on 
elections in many member states of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of possible choice 
on the subject.”218 Further, the Court states, “Any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light 
of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in 
the context of one system may be justified in the context of another.”219 The Court is of the opinion 
that as long as electoral systems can fulfil their very objective, which is a reflection of people 
opinion, they do not violate the right to political participation.220 In this regard, the Court 
formulates two contrasting tasks for electoral systems: 
 […] electoral systems seek to fulfill objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: 
on the one hand to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and, on the other, to channel currents 
of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will.221  
Therefore, although exception from minimum threshold might not be legally supported, there are 
constraints for the application of the minimum threshold requirement. Indeed, minimum thresholds 
cannot be used as an instrument to push aside the political voices of numerically weak groups, 
such as national minorities. In this respect, the UN Human Rights Committee in GC No.25 states, 
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“If a candidate is required to have a minimum number of supporters for nomination, this 
requirement should be reasonable and not act as a barrier to candidacy.”222  
Moreover, the Lund Recommendations also require member states, however in a non-binding 
manner, to provide lower thresholds for minorities.223 The Framework Convention does not 
contain any provision on the electoral thresholds. However, the Thematic Commentary on Art 15 
implicitly refers to the issue of the effect of thresholds on national minorities’ representation. It 
considers exemption from minimum electoral thresholds, as one of the ways which facilitate 
representation of minorities’ representatives in elected bodies, without requiring any further step 
to be taken by members states in that regard.224 However, contrarily ACFC in its opinion on 
Lithuania, when the government of Lithuania withdraws the exemption from thresholds in 1996, 
the withdrawal of thresholds is not criticised by the Advisory Committee.225  
The case law of the Strasbourg Court indicates that the Court has been very conservative in its 
attitude to electoral thresholds. Even in cases that there were grounds to be sceptical regarding the 
proportionality of high electoral thresholds, which could affect the representation of minorities, 
the Court adopts the same conservative approach. The Court reiterated the position of the former 
Commission that even, “a system which fixe[d] a relatively high threshold,” falls under the wide 
margin of appreciation of states.226 Similarly, in a case against Germany, the Court adopted the 
view that although FCNM advises states to have more favourable treatment in this regard, ECHR 
did not call for any differential treatment in favour of minority parties. The Court stated in its 
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judgment, “there is not any obligation derived from FCNM provisions to exempt national 
minorities from the requirement of meeting the electoral thresholds.”227  
Subsequently, the Court maintains its former position on the issue of the minimum threshold that 
it falls under the wide margin of discretion of member states. The Court maintained that the issue 
of minimum threshold does not automatically constitute a violation of the rights guaranteed under 
P1.3 unless the very essence of the right to political participation is impaired. In Yumak and Sadak, 
the Court seems held that even a 10% threshold in the case of Turkey, which is the highest 
percentage among the CoE member states, does not impair the essence of the right to political 
participation of national minorities.228 The Court considered such a high threshold as a legitimate 
aim under the rubric of the wide margin of appreciation.229  
In the joint dissenting opinion, Judge Tulkens, Judge Vajic Jaeger and Judge Šikuta, regarding the 
imposition of higher than usual minimum thresholds, reject the Courts’ reluctance concerning the 
representation of national minorities. They state that the high minimum thresholds, “[…] virtually 
eliminated the possibility of minority parties to enter the Turkish Grand National Assembly[…]”230 
Therefore, the Court gave a wide margin of appreciation to states, not only in relation to the 
exemption from thresholds but also regarding the issue of high thresholds and refused to judge on 
any fixed minimum threshold, which could have the effect of introducing permissible  rates 
regarding the issue of electoral threshold for member states of the CoE.  
The reasoning of the Court, in addition to the wide margin of discretion of states in relation to their 
domestic social and political circumstance, is that minorities’ right to political participation does 
not foresee a guarantee for winning in elections.231 In other words, neither minority candidates nor 
minority voters can be given any guarantee that they can win in electoral competitions or they can 
be ensured to find their preferable candidates on the candidates’ lists.  
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Although it can be argued that the Court took a justified position in a case against Germany, about 
the exemption of minority candidates from minimum threshold requirements,232 it is not clear why 
the Strasbourg Court failed to distinguish between the guarantee for winning seats and the 
guarantee to compete on equal terms with parties that represent the majority population. Because 
the latter does not imply the exemption of national minorities’ representatives from the 
requirement of the minimum threshold, but quite the opposite, it recognises the necessity of 
thresholds in a proportional manner, which does not impair the representation of minorities in the 
elected bodies. In this respect, the numerical weakness of national minorities makes it extremely 
difficult for parties or candidates who represent them to meet the high minimum threshold 
requirements. The imposition of higher minimum thresholds can, in fact, impede national 
minorities to become represented in the national legislative bodies, which in practice impairs the 
essence of the right to political participation of national minorities indirectly. 
Presumably, solutions such as forming multi-party coalitions might not be appealing for directly 
representing minorities’ interests in important decision-making bodies, such as the national 
parliaments. As stated in the joint dissenting opinion in the Sadak and Yumak case, there is no 
certainty that forming multi-party coalitions, “will remain available in the future.”233 Also, the 
dissenting judges argued, “to achieve such alliances, candidates from one party have to be 
accepted, even approved of, by another party, [which] undermines the independence of parties 
especially in respect of their representatives standing as candidates on other parties’ lists.” 234 
In general, the Court takes into account the political and constitutional systems of member states 
in its assessment of elections. Despite the wide discretion of states, the Court maintains its position, 
“to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied 
with.”235The historical context of states, as well as the stage of evolution of the country under 
review concerning democratic values, are factors for determination of any divergence from the 
guaranteed right under P1.3.236 As was remarked several times in this thesis, although a one-size-
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fits-all approach regarding issues of national minorities’ political participation is not a feasible 
approach, the Court could have followed its logic of case by case assessment more effectively 
regarding the issue of minorities’ representation.  
6.3.2. Minority Representation in Majority Systems: the Effect of Electoral Boundaries 
It is worth mentioning that the thesis does not intend to prescribe the proportional system over the 
majority or vice versa because it does not have any legal basis in the current body of international 
law standards. It is only intended to take into account some special measures which might have a 
negative or positive impact on the right to political participation of national minorities. In this 
regard, some of these measures might even hamper the essence of the right to political 
participation.  
The primary concern in states with a majority system is the issue of drawing electoral boundaries, 
which can have a detrimental effect on the right to political participation of minorities. The Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines Gerrymandering as, “The practice of dividing a geographical area into 
electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage 
by diluting the opposition's voting strength.”237 
Therefore, gerrymandering, as indicated in the above definition, is a manipulative practice of 
changing electoral boundaries to change electoral results in the advantage of a group, and it is a 
relevant issue in majority systems.  When minorities are concentrated in one part of the territory 
of a state, the drawing of boundaries can positively or negatively affect their voting rights and their 
representation in decision-making bodies. In addition to the negative effects of gerrymandering on 
the right of political participation of minorities, it can undermine the equality of voters and the 
principle of one-person, one-vote as a foundational principle, which makes an election genuine 
and capable of expressing the wills of citizens.238 
The Human Rights Committee in GC No. 25 deals with the issue of drawing electoral boundaries 
and holds that states have a general obligation to ensure that their electoral systems are compatible 
with the rights protected by article 25 of ICCPR. The Committee states, “the drawing of electoral 
boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or 
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discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens 
to choose their representatives freely.”239 The same position is reflected in Art 16 of FCNM as 
well as FCNM Explanatory Report.240 Article 16 of FCNM stipulates, “The Parties shall refrain 
from measures which alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons 
belonging to national minorities and are aimed at restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from 
the principles enshrined in the present Framework Convention.” 241 However, as the Explanatory 
Report of FCNM clarifies, these alterations can be done if a legitimate aim is pursued.242 For 
instance, if the construction of a dam requires the resettlement of persons who belong to a minority 
group.243 The negative effect of changing constituency boundaries on the right to public 
participation of individuals belonging to national minorities is mentioned in the Thematic 
Commentary to Article 15 of FCNM, which asks member states to consult with minorities if any 
reform is to be made.244  Therefore, states cannot adopt measures to reduce the proportion of 
minorities in the areas inhabited by them as an instrument to limit the possibility of their 
representation.245  
Furthermore, the principle of good faith as enshrined in the preamble and Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that states should discharge their obligations with good 
faith.246 Also, Article 17 of ECHR and Article 5.1 of ICCPR both provide for the prohibition of 
the abuse of rights, which prohibits states from destructing the meaningful exercise of the 
guaranteed human rights and freedoms.247 Naturally, the practice of redrawing electoral boundaries 
if aims for a covert limitation of the right to political participation by national minorities will 
constitute an unlawful measure. In other words, it can trigger states responsibility concerning the 
protection of the right to political participation. The approach of the Strasbourg Court, in its case 
law dealing with Article 3 of Protocol No.1, confirms that despite the wide margin of appreciation 
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of member states regarding P1.3 they cannot render the right guaranteed under P1.3 ineffective. In 
this regard, deliberately changing electoral boundaries have a negative effect on political 
participation of national minorities and is against the principle of good faith, which falls short of 
respecting the content of the right to political participation for national minorities.248 Also, within 
the non-binding framework of OSCE, the Lund Recommendations highlights the potential 
negative effect of boundaries on the equal representation of minorities.249 
Although gerrymandering is against the principle of good faith, states can take affirmative 
measures to facilitate the representation of national minorities by positive gerrymandering. States 
can draw electoral boundaries as a leverage to increase the possibility of representation for national 
minorities. Thus, redrawing electoral boundaries in favour of national minorities is permissible if 
it aims to overcome the problem of underrepresentation of national minority groups in legislative 
bodies. In this regard, Thematic Commentary on FCNM can be interpreted to welcome reforms in 
electoral boundaries that increase opportunities for representation of national minorities.250  
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7. Issues Concerning Minorities Representations in the Legislature 
7.1. The knowledge of the Official Language 
One aspect of the right of individuals belonging to national minorities to political participation is 
the issue of the knowledge of the official language, as a condition for the eligibility of 
representatives of national minority groups to stand as candidates. The international human rights 
provisions that guarantee the right to political participation, including Article 25 of ICCPR and 
P1.3 of ECHR, do not foresee the requirement of the knowledge of the official language as a 
prerequisite for the exercise of this right. However, ACFC considers the issue of language 
requirements, concerning the provisions of FCNM but follows two different approaches. On the 
one hand, the Advisory Committee in its Thematic Commentary on Article 15 provides that the 
knowledge of the official language of the state should not impede members of a minority group to 
stand as candidates in elections.251 In this regard, ACFC, in its first opinion on Estonia, encourages 
the government of Estonia to nullify these requirements due to their negative effect on the right to 
political participation of individuals who belong to national minorities.252  
On the other hand, ACFC takes a different approach in relation to public administration bodies, 
and state organs that provide public services. ACFC adopts the view that the requirement of 
language proficiency in order to access certain jobs in the public administration is justified, as far 
as the proficiency requirements are not disproportionate and states have provided language training 
courses to individuals belonging to national minorities.253 It implies that although the knowledge 
of the official language is required, it should not be disproportional and opportunities to learn the 
official language should be easily available to persons who belong to national minorities.254  
Therefore, ACFC is of the opinion that requirements related to the knowledge of the official 
language are justified to the extent they are objective and proportionate. However, the approach of 
ACFC is different concerning the language requirements for the exercise of the right to political 
participation. ACFC holds that the requirement of the knowledge of the official language is 
                                                          
251 ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, 5 May 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para 102. 
252 ACFC, 1st opinion on Estonia, 14 September 2001, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002)5, para. 55. 
253 ACFC, Commentary on the Effective Participation of persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social 
and Economic Life and In public Affairs, 5 May 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para. 126. 
254 Ibid, para 126; see ACFC, 1st Opinion on Azerbaijan, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2004)001, 22 May 2003. Para. 79. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
64 
 
incompatible with Art 15 of FCNM.255 It seems unclear why ACFC hold divergent attitudes, 
regarding the legislature and the administrative bodies, because the lack of official language by 
candidates of minorities might affect the communications within the legislature and give rise to 
difficulties in the functioning of the legislatures in the same manner as the administrative bodies.  
The right to stand as a candidate is not an absolute right. The Strasbourg Court acknowledges that 
states can legitimately impose stricter eligibility criteria on those who want to stand for election.256 
Also, the GC No.25 of the UN Human Rights Committee confirms that states can impose 
restrictions and requirements concerning the candidacy and direct participation of citizens in 
elections. There is not any explicit reference to the requirement of knowledge of the official 
language by minority candidates among the grounds that are banned in the GC No. 25, but the 
general criterion is that limitations and requirements should be reasonable and proportionate. 257 
Restrictions pertaining to the knowledge of the official language of a state, naturally, affect 
individuals who belong to a national minority group and speak a minority language, which does 
not have official status. In this regard, states have wide discretion regarding the imposition of the 
requirement of the knowledge of the official language of the state on national minorities’ 
candidates. 
The case law before the European Court of Human Rights indicates that the language proficiency 
requirements are in themselves perfectly acceptable from the Convention point of view.258 The 
Court in the Podkolzina case observed that the requirement of the sufficient knowledge of the 
official language might pursue a legitimate aim, and this decision is determined by the historical 
and, political considerations, specific to each country.259 Indeed, states have a legitimate interest 
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in ensuring that their institutions function properly, and this might require the imposition of a 
common working language to ensure the smooth work of the elected bodies.260  
Therefore, the approach of the Court, regarding the language requirements, is that states have a 
wide margin of appreciation in this regard.261 Also, the Strasbourg Court, in its analysis of the wide 
margin of appreciation, does not apply its typical ‘necessity test’ or the existence of a ‘pressing 
social need’ in relation to qualifications imposed on the exercise of the right to political 
participation. In other words, states can justify their measures on more grounds than of those 
grounds listed in Articles 8 to 11 of ECHR, which contain a qualifying clause on the legitimate 
grounds for the exercise of the rights. The compliance of states’ restrictions with the content of 
P1.3 requires two criteria, and those are the lack of arbitrariness in imposing restrictive measures 
(the official language requirement) and the proportionality of restrictive measures or eligibility 
requirements.262 Indeed, the Court’s assessment is to clarify whether restrictions and eligibility 
requirements had the effect of rendering the content of P1.3 ineffective or not.263  Furthermore, the 
UN Human Rights Committee adopts the same approach to the assessment of the legality of 
restrictions imposed on the right to public participation as enshrined in article 25 of ICCPR. The 
Committee, similarly, follows the two-layered analysis of the legality or the lack of arbitrariness 
and proportionality.264  
Considering the requirement of the knowledge of the official language for persons belonging to 
minorities, the Court in the Podkolzina case, based on the general assessment criteria we discussed 
above, found a violation of Art 3 of protocol No.1 of ECHR. The violation of P1.3, however, was 
not based on the fact that the government of Latvia imposed language requirements on minorities’ 
candidates. The violation of P1.3 was based on the process and the degree of restrictions which 
were not proportional and had the effect of impairing the essence of the right to stand as minorities’ 
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candidate in the election.265 In fact, although the candidate had a language proficiency certificate, 
the government did not accept the applicant’s certificate because her language competencies might 
have deteriorated from the time she had received the certificate, and consequently, the applicant’s 
certificate was refused to be taken into account as a proof for her language proficiency.266 The 
Court found the restrictions unjustified and stipulated, “Any guarantee of objectivity and the 
procedure applied to the applicant was incompatible with requirements of procedural fairness and 
legal certainty.”267  
In general, it seems that the approach of ACFC to the issue of the elimination of the language 
proficiency requirements for minorities’ candidate in the legislature is not supported in the case 
law of ECtHR. In other words, it might be far-fetched to think of legal obligation for states to 
eliminate the requirement of the knowledge of the official language for national minorities’ 
representatives who want to stand as candidates in elections. As was observed by the Court, the 
imposition of language requirements to ensure the normal functioning of national institutions is, 
“incontestably legitimate,” and, “applies all the more to the national parliament, which is vested 
with legislative power and plays a primordial role in a democratic State.”268  
Those states which host national minorities on their territory might legitimately require the 
knowledge of the official language of the state. In this regard, states might not have any obligation 
under international law to exempt individuals belonging to national minority groups from having 
sufficient language skills. However, they will be in breach of their obligations regarding the 
protection of the right to political participation of national minorities if they disproportionately 
employ the official language requirement to impede members of national minority groups from 
being represented in the elected bodies.  
7.2. Parliamentary Practices Affecting the Effective Participation of National Minorities 
The right to effective participation in public life is not limited to the framework of elections. 
Political participation should be understood as a process by which different issues unfold as the 
process proceeds. The effective participation of minorities, as recalled by the Thematic 
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Commentary to Article 15 of FCNM, should not be understood as a process which is limited to 
election day.269 In addition to the considerations which are related to the participation of minorities 
through elections, it is important to take into account whether the representatives of national 
minority groups are vested with reasonable means in order to be able to influence the decisions 
taken by the majority representatives. In this regard, the representation is a necessary requisite for 
the facilitation of participation of national minorities in political life, but it is not enough to 
effectively guarantee their influence. The Thematic Commentary of ACFC on Article 15 of FCNM 
emphasises the participation of national minorities as, “an obligation of result.”270 Such a result-
oriented approach serves as a guide to appreciate what other conditions should be met to give effect 
to the right to political participation of national minorities. Therefore, in order to analyze the 
effectiveness of the right to political participation, one should also consider the ability of 
individuals belonging to minorities to meaningfully influence over the course of decision-making, 
beyond their mere representation in the elected bodies. 271 
National minorities’ representatives can influence the public decisions taken at parliaments in 
various ways. The continuum of mechanisms and powers vested in minorities’ representatives 
range from parliamentary communications by which the representatives can protect their interests, 
and thus, reflect the perspective of national minorities, to special powers granted to minority 
representative, such as veto powers to turn down decisions which negatively affect the interests of 
a national minority group.272  
One of the main instruments of representatives in parliaments to influence the final result of 
decision-making is through communication and speech. Parliamentary deliberations have two 
main benefits, which minority representatives or parties can make the best use of it for the 
advantage of protecting the interest of their constituencies. The first benefit of deliberations is that 
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deliberations are informative, and representatives of minorities can present the claims of minorities 
in a national decision-making forum.273 It will have the effect of introducing the concerns of 
minority communities, and this will have the advantage of giving knowledge to members of 
parliament who might be unaware of the issues related to minorities.  
The second benefit of deliberation is the transformative effect of deliberation, which is especially 
true when legislative proposals can affect minorities negatively.274Indeed, decisions concerning 
minorities can be transformed, altered, and better appropriated regarding the cultural interests of 
national minority groups through the use of deliberation by national minorities’ representatives.275   
The Strasbourg Court also recognises the importance of debates in parliaments, or their equivalents 
with legislative authority, in respect of presentation and protection of interests of different 
segments of society.276 In fact, the correlation between an effective political democracy and an 
effective parliament, which enables the members of parliament to participate equally in 
parliamentary proceedings, is highlighted by the Court.277The legislative bodies should allow 
representatives of national minorities to participate in debates and discussions to present their ideas 
freely. In this regard, the Court acknowledges a heightened level of protection for the right to 
freedom of expression for representatives and states:  
There can be no doubt that speech in Parliament enjoys an elevated level of protection. Parliament is a unique 
forum for debate in a democratic society, which is of fundamental importance. The elevated level of 
protection for speech therein is demonstrated, among other things, by the rule of parliamentary immunity.278  
Therefore, statements made by national minorities’ representatives, through debates and 
communications in parliaments, might even call into question the current constitutional order or 
organisation of a state for the aim of promotion and protection of their specific cultures and 
interests. The ability of minorities’ representatives for presenting their priorities and perspectives 
cannot be pushed aside, because they invoke secessionist sentiments or question the territorial 
integrity of a state. As stated by the Court, “it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse 
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political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a State 
is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”279  
The obligation of result, mentioned in ACFC Commentary on Article 15 of FCNM regarding the 
provision of effective political participation for national minorities, can be read in lights of the real 
opportunities that allow minorities to reflect their concerns through their representatives in 
legislative bodies. It is through this opportunity that everyone’s voice is heard and the final result 
of public decisions can be a consensus, which is not disadvantageously against a minority 
community.  
The importance of the inclusion of minorities’ voice through deliberations is a fundamental aspect 
of the protection of minorities’ cultural identity. In this regard, the UN Human Rights Committee, 
in Apirana Mahuika stated, “the enjoyment of the right to one’s own culture may require positive 
legal measures of protection by a State party and measures to ensure the effective participation of 
members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.”280 The requirement for 
providing a real opportunity for debate and consultation, with representatives of persons belonging 
to national minorities in decision-making, is also confirmed in the views of the UN Human Rights 
Committee. The Committee, in GC No. 23, holds that the protection of the right to enjoy culture 
guaranteed under article 27 of ICCPR might require states to ensure effective political participation 
of individuals belonging to minorities in matters which directly affect them.281 In this regard, the 
Committee finds no violation of article 27 in the individual communications, such as Apirana 
Mahuika and Länsman, because governments had gone through extensive consultation with 
minorities and they were allowed to contribute sufficiently throughout the course of decision-
making.282  In fact, the measures of governments of New Zealand and Finland could have directly 
affected the members of national minorities’ lifestyle and could have potentially triggered state 
responsibility regarding the protection of minorities’ right to freely enjoy their culture. However, 
because affected communities had the opportunity to participate in the negotiation processes, the 
                                                          
279 Socialist party and Others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 25 May 1998, Application No. 
20/1997/804/1007, para. 47.  
280 Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand (Communication No. 547/1993), UN Human Rights Committee, Views 
adoptd 27 October 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.5. 
281 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, April 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 7. 
282 Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand (Communication No. 547/1993), UN Human Rights Committee, Views 
adoptd 27 October 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.8. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
70 
 
Committee found no violation of Article 27. Therefore, an effective right to public participation of 
individuals belonging to minorities can only be exercised when the voice of minority 
representatives is taken into account through debate and consultation in matters which directly can 
affect their cultural rights.  
8. Participation of Minorities through Autonomous Arrangements 
8.1. Autonomous Arrangements: a Legal Right or a National Compromise 
Minorities’ participation in political and public life can be designed in two distinguished levels, 
namely, their participation within the legislative body of states to protect and promote their culture, 
and interests through representation and the exercise of electoral rights (as was discussed in the 
previous chapters). The public participation through channels of representation and elections is 
also a guaranteed human right embedded in international human rights law instruments. The 
second aspect is national minorities’ participation through means of self-governance or 
autonomous arrangements, which allows them to control their affairs directly. The following graph 
illustrates the different levels of minorities’ participation in decision-making on a continuum of 
participation and the level of protection which is afforded in the current corpus of international 
law. 
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For more clarity, we should first look into the definition and types of autonomy. Autonomy, as 
Hannum Hurst states, “[is] a relative term which describes a degree of independence of a particular 
entity […]”.283 Markku Suksi argues, “[…] autonomy arrangements are often very pragmatic ad 
hoc solutions that escape generalizations.”284Suksi suggests that autonomies can be divided, 
concerning their spatial dimension and legislative powers.285 Regarding the spatial dimension, 
autonomies can be divided into territorial and non-territorial autonomies. In fact, territorial 
autonomy exists when territorial boundaries determine the authority of an entity.286 The non-
territorial form of autonomy (cultural autonomy) is not based on territorial boundaries; however, 
it exercises its authority over individuals who wish to be affiliated with a national minority group.  
The spatial dimension of autonomies can be coupled with another distinction which is related to 
types of powers and authorities of these entities. They can be divided into autonomous 
arrangements with legislative powers and regulatory powers.287 Those autonomous entities that 
enjoy legislative powers, either territorial or non-territorial, have the power of norm-setting (law-
making) and as a consequence would entail administrative and regulatory powers in extensive 
areas.288 Regulatory power, however, can usually be exercised in matters related to administration, 
budgetary powers, and so forth and need to be compatible with the legislation of the national 
parliaments.289  
On the basis of this analysis which considers autonomy as a need-based arrangement, one can 
conclude that the ad hoc nature of autonomous arrangements is based on the will of states to limit 
their sovereignty and transfer it to a form of a sub-state entity to meet the demands of a particular 
national minority group.290 When autonomy is conferred to a national minority group through 
democratic legislative institutions, where national minorities are already represented, this indicates 
that structures of inclusive decision-making respecting principles of pluralism and non-
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discrimination are already existent. In other words, it is through the exercise of the right to political 
participation which members of a national minority group can give an institutional aspect to their 
right to political participation, in the form of autonomy. This understanding of autonomy is 
confirmed by a group of scholars, such as Suksi,291 Friedlander,292 and Eide293who believe that 
autonomy is not a right but a claim, which can be considered in a democratic setting. Such 
understanding of autonomy is more in line with the current corpus of international law, because it 
is difficult to find a solid legal ground for justification of autonomy as a right for national minority 
groups, and consequently, an obligation to be discharged by states in relation to their national 
minorities.  
It can be argued that the right to effective political participation, only indirectly, suggests the 
possibility of an autonomy arrangement for a minority group in the sense that when channels for 
minorities’ political participation are open as a result of national consensus, a national minority 
group might acquire an autonomous arrangement.  
8.2. Autonomy and Self-Determination 
Autonomy or self-governing arrangements are mechanisms for the facilitation of participation of 
minorities in political and public life. Autonomous arrangements, in the most general term, place 
national minority groups in direct control of matters, which are crucial to the preservation of their 
cultural identity. Due to such direct control, autonomous arrangements are one of the most 
effective means of minorities’ public participation for the purpose of protection of their interests. 
In fact, autonomy is an advanced and, “institutionalized form of participation in decision-
making,”294which allows persons who belong to national minority communities to have more 
authority over matters of cultural or economic importance, such as education, public budget 
determination or the use of budgetary sources.  
However, autonomy is a political concept, which cannot find any apparent basis in international 
law. There have been attempts, in the legal literature, to find a proper legal justification for 
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autonomy on the basis of the right to self-determination as enshrined in the common Article 1 of 
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Some legal 
commentators contemplate autonomy as a component of the right of peoples to self-determination. 
In this form of contemplation, self-determination is considered as a legal concept, which is 
pregnant with different political options, such as federalisation, independence, association with 
another independent state, and autonomy or self-government.295This understanding of autonomy, 
as a component of self-determination, emerges only after the post-colonial era. In this period, the 
orthodoxy regarding the right to self-determination which understands self-determination only in 
the context of decolonisation and the liberation movements is abandoned by some 
commentators.296 In the past decades, the concept of self-determination has gone under 
transformation. In fact, some scholars distinguish between external self-determination, which 
refers to the formation of new states and change of boundaries and the doctrine of internal self-
determination, which focuses on the decentralisation of state power without change of state 
boundaries.297 The move towards articulating an internal dimension for the right to self-
determination confirms the existing reluctance of international community to accept any change 
in state boundaries and reiterates the principality of territorial integrity of sovereign states in 
international law. The doctrine of internal self-determination, which autonomy relies on it, 
presumes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. However, it claims for the 
decentralisation of state authority in favour of national minority communities to enable them to 
exercise self-government over matters of cultural importance to them.   
Despite the scholarly attempts to find legal justification for autonomy through internal self-
determination, autonomy remains a vague concept within international law with no clear legal 
consequences. In this regard, except for Article 7 of ILO Convention No. 169,298 which addresses 
the right of indigenous people to autonomous arrangements, there is no firm ground in international 
                                                          
295 Brownlie, Ian. Treaties and Indigenous Peoples, 1992, p. 48.  
296 Welhengama, Gnanapala. Minorities' Claims: From Autonomy to Secession: International Law and State Practice. 
2000, pp. 128-132. 
297 See Cassese, Antonio. Self Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, p. 332. Kimminich, Otto. "A federal Right of Self-determination. " Modern Law of Self-Determination, 
edited by Tomuschat, Christian, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 1993, p. 100.  
298 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, entered into force 5 
September 1991, Article 7. 
Amin Labbafi 
 
74 
 
law instruments regarding autonomous arrangements for national minorities.299According to 
Suksi, “There is undoubtedly no right to autonomy at the level of general international law. 
Autonomy is thus not a specific human right, formulated as such”.300 In the same line of argument, 
Hurst Hannum characterises autonomous arrangements as, “one step below full self-determination 
but one step above minority rights.”301 Therefore, one can assert that autonomous arrangements as 
a form of political participation of national minorities are not within reach of international law and 
their articulation is better situated in the setting of constitutional law.   
8.3. Establishing the Right to Autonomy and the Problem of Legal Status  
After the peace treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century, which ended the thirty years war in Europe, 
the international community was founded upon the concept of the sovereign state.302 Despite 
erosions of state sovereignty, such as obligations of states to comply with international human 
rights law, the Westphalian foundation of international law reinforces the importance of the 
principle of state sovereignty and the authority of states over their domestic affairs. Regarding 
autonomous arrangements, the adoption of such entities falls under the domestic competency of 
states. Therefore, international organisations do not seem to be the competent bodies to decide on 
the necessity of such arrangements. Indeed, any claim to autonomous arrangement shall be made 
through the channels of legislation provided in national constitutions and through a democratic 
process of decision-making.  
One of the theoretical legal difficulties that arise from treating territorial autonomy as a right is the 
problem of legal status, which can be explained by drawing upon Robert Alexy’s explanation of 
legal status. 
According to Alexy, there are four categories of status concerning the relationship between 
individuals and states. These categories are passive status, negative status, positive status, and 
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active status.303 The passive status refers to the duties of individuals to obey certain laws; in other 
words, it is the realm of command and prohibition issued and enforced by the state.304The negative 
status includes liberties and freedoms which states should refrain from interfering; these are mainly 
negative freedoms and rights, which might have a positive aspect as well.305 For example, the right 
to non-interference in one’s privacy. The positive status encompasses the rights and freedoms that 
states need to take measures to protect them. This might also include the rights and freedoms which 
fall under the category of negative status. Indeed, these are the rights and liberties that states need 
to refrain from interference, and at the same time, they should take measures to prepare the 
necessary conditions for the enjoyment of those rights.306 For instance, the right to privacy requires 
a state not to interfere within the private sphere of individuals, but it also requires states to take 
measures to protect it regarding third-party actors. Also, the right to protect universal education is 
another example that falls under the category of positive status. The active status, however, refers 
to a granted capacity beyond that of natural rights and liberties. This status is concerned with the 
conferred legal power to participate in the process of public decision-making of a state.307 The 
active status, according to Alexy, has a special position regarding the other three categories of 
status because it reflects more or less, elements of the other three categories, especially the negative 
and the positive status.308 In this regard, giving shape to the content of the active status is, “left 
free to the individual.”309 
With these categories of legal status, we are provided with a proper abstract tool to examine the 
plausibility of considering autonomy as a right. Based on the model provided by Alexy, the active 
status presumes the right of individuals to participate in political affairs through democratic 
channels of participation. Indeed, the active status gives individuals, “the capacity to become 
active for the state” in the form of representation or voting in elections.310In this regard, envisage 
of further participatory mechanisms, such as autonomies, are left for participants to determine. In 
other words, individuals are at first guaranteed a right to participate in the political life of a state, 
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but further institutional forms of political participation (establishing autonomous arrangements) 
are something that should be the result of a public decision within a state.  
Therefore, autonomy is a specific model for public participation, and the determination of the form 
of participation is dependent on the agreement reached by democratic negotiations in a parliament 
or other decision-making body. In other words, autonomy is better placed in the constitutional 
fabric of states and is the outcome of a national compromise.  
8.4. Autonomy: Protection of Minorities’ Cultural Life 
There have been attempts to construct the concept of autonomy upon the guaranteed human rights, 
such as the freedom of association and the right to freely enjoy culture, as enshrined in ICCPR and 
ECHR. Autonomy, in this sense, is a non-territorial autonomy with limited authority only 
concerning cultural matters of minority communities. Such elaborations on autonomy separate 
themselves from an understanding of autonomy as an institution with legislative authority or 
territorial boundaries. The origins of such contemplations of autonomy with limited authority, 
which encompass only the self-governance of cultural affairs, can be traced back to Otto Bauer 
and Karl Renner, who developed the idea of cultural autonomy to enable individuals belonging to 
minority groups to decide over their cultural matters.311 This form of autonomy is usually called 
cultural autonomy. Asbjørn Eide defines cultural autonomy as, “[…] the right to self-rule, by a 
culturally defined group, regarding matters which affect the maintenance and reproduction of its 
culture”.312 Taking into account that the protection of national minorities’ culture is one of the 
principal aims of the right to political participation of persons belonging to minorities, cultural 
autonomy, can provide minorities with mechanisms to further their interests by directly deciding 
over their cultural matters.  
There have been attempts to find a legal justification for the doctrine of cultural autonomy, based 
on Article 27 of ICCPR in conjunction with the right to freedom of association, to give an 
institutional aspect to the right to freedom of culture. Such an approach to cultural autonomy allows 
minority groups to self-rule the cultural aspects of their communities through certain private forms 
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of institutions.313 This institutional dimension of the exercise of the right to culture is also 
mentioned by Article 27 of ICCPR which states, “[…] persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”.314The reference 
to the practice of culture, “in community with others,”315 carries an institutional necessity with 
it.316 In fact, the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 27 of ICCPR, as Suksi claims, presumes 
an organised form for the practice of culture in the forms of private institutions, such as 
corporations and associations to self-rule certain aspects of the cultural identity of a minority 
group.317 
In this regard, the concept of autonomy, as a non-legislative, non-territorial form of self-rule over 
limited aspects of cultural life, has the potential of envisaging a form of autonomy which can meet 
the cultural needs of members of minority communities. It is especially beneficial for those 
minorities who might not have access to means of participation in public decision-making. For 
instance, Romas that are traditionally non-territorial minorities due to their nomadic lifestyle can 
benefit from such arrangements.318 Therefore, unlike autonomous arrangements with either 
territorial features or legislative powers, non-territorial forms of autonomy do not necessarily need 
to be vested with special legislative competencies in matters related to a minority culture.319 In 
fact, under the model of personal autonomy, as Suksi explains, members of minority communities 
can preserve their cultural needs using already guaranteed individual human rights, such as the 
right to culture and the freedom of association which states have the responsibility to respect and 
protect.320  
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According to Suksi, there are two major differences between the self-governance of minority 
communities, in the form of private associations, and self-governance, in the form of a public law 
entity. First, the self-governance of minority communities’ cultural matters under the rubric of 
personal autonomy and other types of cultural self-governance is that the former uses self-
governance in a horizontal fashion whereas, the latter seeks to establish a vertical relationship 
between the autonomous entity and members of the minority group.321 Secondly, self-governance 
of cultural matters under the form of private associations can be protected as a human right while 
cultural self-governance in the form of a public governmental entity is a claim which can be 
granted only under the public law of a country.322 If we presume that the ultimate objective of 
public participation of minorities is to enable members of minority groups to control over affairs 
important for their cultural identity, the cultural self-governance of private associations can have 
important implications for the preservation of minorities’ cultural identity.323  
Nonetheless, autonomous arrangements, in the form of personal autonomy or a private entity, 
cannot be a compromise or a substitute for the participation of members of national minority 
groups in decision-making institutions. It is because they neither can influence national decision-
making nor have any regulative authority to control matters which directly concern them. In this 
respect, cultural autonomy understood as personal autonomy with no legislative powers or any 
state-like authority cannot even meaningfully encompass aspects of the cultural life of minorities. 
For example, certain minority groups might have cultural norms, regarding issues with legal 
characteristics, such as inheritance, and marriage. Presuming that such cultural norms are in accord 
with international human rights law standards, states should, in one way or another, grant minority 
communities a form of competency to exercise self-rule in matters which are otherwise within the 
competency of national laws and national courts of states. In this regard, the historical model of 
Millet in the Ottoman Empire, which is reflected in the legal order of some Middle Eastern 
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countries, such as Iran324and Egypt,325allows certain national minority groups to have personal 
autonomy over legal and cultural affairs of their members. Such autonomy is in the form of 
competency of minorities to have competency over managing issues with cultural importance to 
them. In this regard, it seems that even articulation of autonomous arrangement in the sense of 
personal autonomy cannot transplant the idea of autonomy in the present structure of international 
law order. It highlights the fact that even an effective personal autonomy needs some form of 
political will to be formed domestically to entrench an institutional form for minorities to self-
govern their cultural practices. Therefore, one can argue that until the emergence of new binding 
rules in international law, which provide for some form of autonomy for national minority groups, 
autonomy as such cannot be regarded as an institution for public participation of members of 
minority groups in the form of a human right.   
As was discussed in section 8.1, the participation of minorities can be distinguished in two different 
categories. One is political participation in national governing bodies, such as the legislative bodies 
of states, to pursue their interests in the process of national decision-making. The other form is 
through allowing national minorities to establish their institutions and give them a form of 
autonomy for self-governance.  
Cultural autonomy, with no regulative capacity, can be beneficial for the preservation of 
minorities’ cultural autonomy.  This form of autonomy can be justified based on the right to 
freedom of association guaranteed in Article 11 of ECHR and Article 22 of ICCPR. Nonetheless, 
these associations cannot be a substitute for the participation of national minorities in national 
decision-making bodies. The Strasbourg Court also confirms the crucial importance of the freedom 
of association in relation to the preservation of minorities' cultural identity; however, the Court 
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highlights the primary importance of political participation as the cornerstone of an effective 
democracy. The Court states: 
It is only natural that, where a civil society functions in a healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the 
democratic process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to associations which they may integrate 
with each other and pursue common objectives collectively. […]. Indeed, forming an association in order to 
express and promote its identity may be instrumental in helping minority to preserve and uphold its rights.326  
As was examined, the major implication of personal autonomy in the form of civic associations is 
for the protection of the right to culture of non-national minorities, such as newly formed minorities 
or minorities with nomadic lifestyles. Therefore, respect for the right of individuals belonging to 
minorities to freely practice their culture in conjunction with the right to freedom of association 
can become a framework to accommodate cultural needs of members of such minority groups the 
manner in which states can be held responsible for respecting such civic arrangements.  
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9. Conclusion 
The events of the 1990s, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ethnic conflicts in the 
Balkan region, had important effects on the emergence of a different attitude towards democracy 
and the right to political participation. The issue of minorities’ protection, and especially their 
inclusion in the political life of states, came to the foreground when the nationalism along the line 
of ethnicity in Central and Eastern Europe led to violent ethnic conflicts.327 In response to this 
course of events, there were legal and political attempts by states which placed the protection of 
minorities both as a solution for the prevention of future conflicts and as one part of the project of 
human rights, which states were obliged to protect.  
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe introduced the human dimension project 
in 1990 Copenhagen and 1992 Helsinki Documents. These attempts, although they were non-legal, 
provided the foundation for further development of standards, which made Europe a leading 
example of the development of minority rights protection. Taking into account the unsuccessful 
attempts to include an additional protocol to ECHR on the protection of minority rights the entry 
into force of FCNM in 1998 as the only legally-binding instrument of international law for the 
protection of minority rights marks a decisive point in the evolution of minority rights.  
The FCNM has several deficiencies, such as compromising the content of its provisions by giving 
a wide margin of discretion to member states and adopting a vague language.328Nonetheless, 
Article 15 of FCNM and the Thematic Commentary on Article 15 highlight the importance of the 
right to political participation of members of national minority groups (a sensitive political issue). 
Article 15 of FCNM not only entitles minority groups a share in the political life of member states 
but also goes beyond what a decade before the adoption of FCNM was as a matter of domestic 
politics.329 The importance of the right to political participation for individuals belonging to 
national minorities is the extent to which ACFC, as the monitoring body of the Framework 
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Convention, considers public participation along with full equality and freedom of culture as three 
foundational pillars of FCNM.330  
In the CoE region, the protection of the right to political participation of members of minority 
groups is not limited to FCNM. The ECtHR has developed an ever-increasing body of case law, 
which fully or partially, deals with some aspects of the right to political participation and can be 
relied upon concerning the right to political participation of individuals who identify themselves 
as belonging to national minorities. The Strasbourg Court, in its case law, acknowledges the wide 
margin of discretion of member states in the implementation of P1.3 of ECHR. However, at the 
same time, it develops principles which can be used to outline the content of the right to political 
participation for individuals belonging to national minorities. Those are the principle of pluralism, 
the prohibition of discrimination, and the idea of effective realisation of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the Convention. The application of these considerations leads us to the conclusion 
that states cannot use their discretion to render the right to political participation an illusory right 
with regard to national minorities.331   
Elections as the most crucial channel for political participation in contemporary representative 
democracies and the issues pertaining to their procedural fairness have important consequences 
for the right to political participation of national minorities. Special circumstances of members of 
national minority groups might give shape to the component elements of electoral rights including, 
the right to vote and the right to stand as candidates in the election. In this regard, issues of electoral 
systems cannot be treated as only matters of technical design due to their substantial impact on the 
exercise of the right to political participation of national minorities.  
The main position of the Court is that “Article 3 of Protocol 1 does not impose a particular kind of 
electoral system.”332 However, while admitting the wide margin of appreciation and the non-
absolute nature of the right to free elections the Court, “preserves its role in the last resort to 
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determine whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with.”333 In determining 
whether the requirements of P1.3 have been complied with, the Court conducts an effectiveness 
test334to examine if measures adopted by states under their margin of discretion have curtailed the 
very essence of the right in question.335 Although the Court has been very conservative in this 
regard,336 it removes any normative ground from under any claim which aims to exclude national 
minority voices from participating in political institutions.  
The present thesis examined the right to political participation of members of national minority 
communities, mostly concerning various aspects of the right to free elections. However, autonomy 
is another form of participation which places national minorities in direct control of their affairs. 
Although much can be achieved through establishing arrangements of self-governance for 
minority groups, there seems to be no discrepancy among legal scholars that in the current body 
of international law there is no solid legal justification for a right to autonomous arrangements.337 
Also, the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee confirms that attempts to construct 
demands to autonomy on the basis of Article 1 of ICCPR were not admissible. It is due to the 
collective nature of Article 1 does not allow individual communications to be lodged according to 
the procedures of Optional Protocol to ICCPR.338 Therefore, autonomy as a form of political 
participation for national minorities cannot be legally justified and enforced within the present 
framework of international law.339  
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Participation in political life lies at the heart of democracy. Democracy, itself, is the only form of 
governance that goes hand in hand with respect for human rights. The nexus between democracy 
and political participation is also related to the idea of pluralism that is one of the principal values 
of genuine and inclusive democracy. The importance of pluralism is the extent to which the 
European Court of Human Rights considers pluralism as a constitutive requirement for 
democracy.340 In this regard, as was examined in the present thesis, the content of the right to 
political participation for national minorities does not contain a new substantive right regarding 
national minorities. In fact, current international law standards and the idea of pluralist democracy 
can normatively cover the political participation of persons belonging to national minorities.  
The content of the right to political participation for minorities might, if circumstances demand, 
necessitate affirmative measures to be taken by states to enable them to exercise their right to 
political participation. In this regard, the difference in lifestyle, language, and cultural identity of 
persons who belong to national minority groups coupled with numerical inferiority and possible 
historical marginalisation might cause special circumstances in which the lack of affirmative 
measures can render their right to political participation illusory. Furthermore, the cultural identity 
of national minorities intensifies the need of national minority groups to political participation in 
order to be able to influence public decisions which affect their identities.  
Hannah Arendt reiterates the importance of the plurality of political voices. Arendt stated that 
“[…] no one could be called happy without his share in public business, that no one could be called 
free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called either happy or free 
without participating and having a share in public power.”341 In the case of political participation 
of national minorities, the meaningful protection of their identity cannot be achieved unless 
members of national minority groups have confidence in the governance of the state and are 
entitled to have their share of influence over the institutions of decision-making. 
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